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Abstract
This paper presents a dynamic political economy theory of public spending, taxation and debt. Policy
choices are made by a legislature consisting of representatives elected by geographically-deﬁned districts.
The legislature can raise revenues via a distortionary income tax and by borrowing. These revenues
c a nb eu s e dt oﬁnance a national public good and district-speciﬁc transfers (interpreted as pork-barrel
spending). The value of the public good is stochastic, reﬂecting shocks such as wars or natural disasters. In
equilibrium, policy-making cycles between two distinct regimes: “business-as-usual” in which legislators
bargain over the allocation of pork, and “responsible-policy-making” in which policies maximize the
collective good. Transitions between the two regimes are brought about by shocks in the value of the
public good. In the long run, equilibrium tax rates are too high and too volatile, public good provision is
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This paper presents a dynamic political economy theory of public spending, taxation and debt.
The theory builds on the well-known tax smoothing approach to ﬁscal policy pioneered by Barro
(1979). This approach predicts that governments will use budget surpluses and deﬁcits as a buﬀer
to prevent tax rates from changing too sharply. Thus, governments will run deﬁcits in times of
high government spending needs and surpluses when needs are low. Underlying the approach are
the assumptions that governments are benevolent, that government spending needs ﬂuctuate over
time, and that the deadweight costs of income taxes are a convex function of the tax rate. The
economic environment underlying our theory is similar to that in the tax smoothing literature.
Our key departure is that policy decisions are made by a legislature rather than a benevolent
planner. Moreover, we introduce the friction that legislators can distribute revenues back to their
districts via pork-barrel spending.
More speciﬁcally, our theory assumes that policy choices are made by a legislature comprised
of representatives elected by single-member, geographically-deﬁned districts. The legislature can
raise revenues in two ways: via a proportional tax on labor income and by borrowing in the
capital market. Borrowing takes the form of issuing one period bonds. The legislature can also
purchase bonds and use the interest earnings to help ﬁnance future public spending if it so chooses.
Public revenues are used to ﬁnance the provision of a public good that beneﬁts all citizens and
to provide targeted district-speciﬁc transfers, which are interpreted as pork-barrel spending. The
value of the public good to citizens is stochastic, reﬂecting shocks such as wars or natural disasters.
The legislature makes policy decisions by majority (or super-majority) rule and legislative policy-
making in each period is modelled using the legislative bargaining approach of Baron and Ferejohn
(1989). The level of public debt acts as a state variable, creating a dynamic linkage across policy-
making periods.
Incorporating political decision making in this way resolves an important theoretical diﬃculty
with the tax smoothing approach ﬁrst pointed out by Aiyagari et al (2002). While Barro’s original
analysis assumes that the government perfectly anticipates its ﬂuctuating spending needs, Aiyagari
et al tackle the more relevant case of uncertainty. They demonstrate that the tax smoothing logic
does not necessarily imply the counter-cyclical theory of deﬁcits and surpluses that it had been
presumed to. In some environments, the optimal policy is for the government to gradually acquire
1suﬃcient bond holdings so as to eventually be able to ﬁnance any level of spending with the
interest earnings from these holdings. This permits the ﬁnancing of government spending without
distortionary taxation. Interest earnings in excess of spending needs are rebated back to citizens
via lump-sum transfers. Obviously, the prediction of a steady state with huge government asset
accumulation and zero taxes is unsatisfactory. This prediction is avoided if exogenous limits on
the amount of debt that the government can hold are imposed, but Aiyagari et al rightly criticize
these as “ad hoc”.1
Intuitively, it seems likely that legislators entrusted with a large stock of government assets
would run it down and distribute the proceeds back to their districts and this is precisely the force
that our theory captures. Thus, despite the fact that there are no ad hoc debt limits, the long run
level of government bond holdings in political equilibrium is below the eﬃcient level. Moreover,
equilibrium policies display the dynamic pattern suggested by Barro; namely, debt goes up when
the value of public goods is high and down when it is low. In addition, debt serves to smooth
taxes.
Our theory also oﬀers a number of other advantages over the basic tax smoothing approach.
First, it allows for the possibility that the government can be in perpetual debt. Second, it provides
predictions concerning the dynamics of legislative policy-making and on the mix of public spending
between pork and public goods. Third, it provides a sharp account of how political decision-making
“distorts” public policies. Fourth, the theory permits a welfare analysis of ﬁscal restraints such as
balanced budget rules.
That pork-barrel spending gives rise to ineﬃciencies in legislative decision making is a core
idea of political economy. Moreover, it is now well understood that in dynamic environments
redistributive considerations can lead legislatures to be present-biased. What is novel about
our paper is that we incorporate these ideas into a dynamic general equilibrium model that
incorporates the key assumptions of the tax smoothing literature. This allows us to better integrate
the political economy and tax smoothing literatures. In particular, we can study how the political
forces favoring present bias in legislative policy-making interact with the economic forces favoring
the use of debt for tax smoothing purposes. The interplay between these forces gives rise to what
is, in our judgement, a richer and more satisfying theory of ﬁscal policy.
1 Shin (2006) shows that this prediction can be avoided if citizens face idiosyncratic and uninsurable productivity
shocks.
2Our basic approach to incorporating legislative decision making into a dynamic general equi-
librium model follows our earlier work in Battaglini and Coate (2007). In that paper, we explored
how pork-barrel spending impacts the overall size of government and distorts investment in pub-
lic capital goods. We analyzed an environment in which in each period the legislature can raise
revenues via a distortionary income tax and these revenues can be used to ﬁnance investment in
a public good and pork-barrel spending. The environment we study in this paper diﬀers in three
key ways. First, the government can borrow as well as levy income taxes. Second, the public
good is not an investment good. Third, the value of the public good is stochastic. This makes for
av e r yd i ﬀerent application, with the key dynamic linkage across periods created by the level of
debt rather than the stock of public good.
The organization of the remainder of the paper is as follows. In the next section we present
the model. Section 3 provides a benchmark by describing the planning solution for the econ-
omy. Section 4 characterizes the political equilibrium and develops the positive predictions of the
theory. Section 5 explains precisely how political decision making distorts the eﬃcient solution.
Section 6 discusses the empirical implications of the theory and section 7 applies the theory to
analyze the desirability of a balanced budget requirement. Section 8 discusses the related political
economy literature and section 9 oﬀers a brief conclusion. The Appendix contains the proofs of
the propositions.
2T h e m o d e l
2.1 The economic environment
A continuum of inﬁnitely-lived citizens live in n identical districts indexed by i =1 ,...,n.T h e
size of the population in each district is normalized to be one. There is a single (nonstorable)
consumption good, denoted by z, that is produced using a single factor, labor, denoted by l,w i t h
the linear technology z = wl. There is also a public good, denoted by g, that can be produced
from the consumption good according to the linear technology g = z/p.
Citizens consume the consumption good, beneﬁt from the public good, and supply labor. Each
citizen’s per period utility function is




where α ∈ (0,1) and ε>0. The parameter A measures the value of the public good to the citizens.
3Citizens discount future per period utilities at rate δ.
The value of the public good varies across periods in a random way, reﬂe c t i n gs h o c k st ot h e
society such as wars and natural disasters. Speciﬁc a l l y ,i ne a c hp e r i o d ,A is the realization of a
random variable with range [A,A]( w h e r e0<A< A) and cumulative distribution function G(A).
The function G is continuously diﬀerentiable and its associated density is bounded uniformly
below by some positive constant ξ>0, so that for any pair of realizations such that A<A 0,t h e
diﬀerence G(A0)−G(A)i sa tl e a s ta sb i ga sξ(A0 −A). Thus, G assigns positive probability to all
nondegenerate sub-intervals of [A,A].
There is a competitive labor market and competitive production of the public good. Thus, the
wage rate is equal to w and the price of the public good is p. There is also a market in risk-free
one period bonds. The assumption of a constant marginal utility of consumption implies that the
equilibrium interest rate on these bonds must be ρ =1 /δ − 1. At this interest rate, citizens will
be indiﬀerent as to their allocation of consumption across time.
2.2 Government policies
The public good is provided by the government. The government can raise revenue by levying a
proportional tax on labor income. It can also borrow and lend in the bond market by selling and
buying risk-free one period bonds.2 Revenues can not only be used to ﬁnance the provision of
the public good but can also be diverted to ﬁnance targeted district-speciﬁc transfers which are
interpreted as (non-distortionary) pork-barrel spending.
Government policy in any period is described by an n +3 - t u p l e{r,g,x,s1,....,sn},w h e r er
i st h ei n c o m et a xr a t e ;g is the amount of the public good provided; x is the amount of bonds
sold; and si is the proposed transfer to district i’s residents. When x is negative, the government
is buying bonds. In each period, the government must also repay any bonds that it sold in the
previous period. Thus, if it sold b bonds in the previous period, it must repay (1 + ρ)b in the
current period. The government’s initial debt level in period 1 is given exogenously and is denoted
by b0.
In a period in which government policy is {r,g,x,s1,....,sn}, each citizen will supply an amount
2 Thus we do not consider state-contingent debt as in Lucas and Stokey (1983). We believe that this is the
appropriate assumption for a positive analysis. We also do not consider debt with diﬀerent maturity structures.
While Angeletos (2002) has argued that maturity structures can substitute for state-contingent debt, his argument
does not apply in our model because the interest rate is constant.
4of labor
l∗(w(1 − r)) = argmax
l




It is straightforward to show that l∗(w(1 − r)) = (εw(1 − r))ε,s ot h a tε is the elasticity of labor
supply. A citizen in district i who simply consumes his net of tax earnings and his transfer will





Since citizens are indiﬀerent as to their allocation of consumption across time, their lifetime
expected utility will equal the value of their initial bond holdings plus the payoﬀ they would
obtain if they simply consumed their net earnings and transfers in each period.
Government policies must satisfy three feasibility constraints. The ﬁrst is that revenues must
be suﬃcient to cover expenditures. To see what this implies, consider a period in which the initial
level of government debt is b and the policy choice is {r,g,x,s1,....,sn}. Expenditure on public
goods and debt repayment is pg +( 1+ρ)b.T a xr e v e n u ei s
R(r)=nrwl∗(w(1 − r)) = nrw(εw(1 − r))ε (4)
and revenue from bond sales is x.L e t t i n gt h en e to ft r a n s f e rs u r p l u s(i.e., the diﬀerence between
revenues and spending on public goods and debt repayment) be denoted by
B(r,g,x;b)=R(r) − pg + x − (1 + ρ)b, (5)
the constraint requires that B(r,g,x;b) ≥
X
i si.
The second constraint is that the district speciﬁc transfers must be non-negative (i.e., si ≥ 0
for all i). This rules out ﬁnancing public spending via district-speciﬁcl u m ps u mt a x e s . W i t h
lump sum taxes, there would be no need to impose the distortionary labor tax and hence no tax
smoothing problem.
The third and ﬁnal constraint is that the amount of government borrowing must be feasible.
In particular, there is an upper limit x on the amount of bonds the government can sell. This
is motivated by the unwillingness of borrowers to hold bonds that they know will not be repaid.
If the government were borrowing an amount x such that the interest payments exceeded the
maximum possible tax revenues; i.e., ρx > maxr R(r) ,t h e ni tw o u l db eu n a b l et or e p a yt h ed e b t
even if it provided no public goods or transfers. Thus, the maximum level of debt is certainly less
5than this level, implying that x ≤ maxr R(r)/ρ. In fact, we will assume that x is slightly smaller
than maxr R(r)/ρ.T h i si sb e c a u s ei fx equals maxr R(r)/ρ then if government debt ever reached
x it would stay there forever, because the legislature could never pay it oﬀ. For our dynamic
results, it is convenient to assume away this (relatively uninteresting) possibility.
We avoid assuming that there is any “ad hoc” limit on the amount of bonds that the government
can purchase (see Aiyagari et al (2002)). In particular, the government is allowed to hold suﬃcient
b o n d st op e r m i ti tt oa l w a y sﬁnance the Samuelson level of the public good from the interest
e a r n i n g s .T h i sl e v e lo fbo n d si sg i v e nb yx = −pgS(A)/ρ, where gS(A) is the level of the public good
that satisﬁes the Samuelson Rule when the value of the public good is A.3 Since the government
will never want to hold more bonds than this, there is no loss of generality in constraining the
choice of debt to the interval [x,x] and we will do this below.4 We also assume that the initial
level of government debt, b0, belongs to the interval [x,x].
2.3 The political process
Government policy decisions are made by a legislature consisting of representatives from each of
the n districts. One citizen from each district is selected to be that district’s representative. Since
all citizens have the same policy preferences, the identity of the representative is immaterial and
hence the selection process can be ignored.5 The legislature meets at the beginning of each
period. These meetings take only an insigniﬁcant amount of time, and representatives undertake
private sector work in the rest of the period just like everybody else. The aﬃrmative votes of
q<nrepresentatives are required to enact any legislation.
To describe how legislative decision-making works, suppose the legislature is meeting at the
beginning of a period in which the current level of public debt is b and the value of the public good
3 The Samuelson Rule is that the sum of marginal beneﬁts equal the marginal cost, which means that gS(A)
satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition that nαAgα−1 = p.
4 By assuming that the government can choose to borrow any amount in the interval [x,x], we are implicitly
assuming that the wage is suﬃciently high that the amount spent on public goods is never higher than national
income. To see this, imagine that the initial level of government debt is b and the government chooses the policy
{r, g,x,s1,....,sn}. Then, feasibility demands that the amount borrowed x must be less than the total amount of
private sector income. The latter is given by
S
i si+(1+ρ)b+n(1−r)w(εw(1−r))ε. Assuming government budget
balance, we know that
S
i si +( 1+ρ)b is equal to x + R(r) − pg. Substituting this in, the feasibility condition
amounts to the requirement that nw(εw(1 −r))ε (which is national income) exceeds pg. In either the equilibrium
or the planner’s solution, national income always exceeds nw(εw( ε
1+ε))ε and public good spending is always less
than pgS(A). Thus, a suﬃcient condition is that nw(εw( ε
1+ε))ε >p g S(A). Of course, such a condition would not
be required in the case of a small open economy which could borrow from abroad.
5 While citizens may diﬀer in their bond holdings, this has no impact on their policy preferences.
6is A. One of the legislators is randomly selected to make the ﬁrst proposal, with each representative
having an equal chance of being recognized. A proposal is a policy {r,g,x,s1,....,sn} that satisﬁes
the feasibility constraints. If the ﬁrst proposal is accepted by q legislators, then it is implemented
and the legislature adjourns until the beginning of the next period. At that time, the legislature
meets again with the diﬀerence being that the initial level of public debt is x and there is a new
realization of the value of public goods. If, on the other hand, the ﬁrst proposal is not accepted,
another legislator is chosen to make a proposal. There are T ≥ 2 such proposal rounds, each of
which takes a negligible amount of time. If the process continues until proposal round T,a n dt h e
proposal made at that stage is rejected, then a legislator is appointed to choose a default policy.
The only restrictions on the choice of a default policy are that it be feasible and that it involve a
uniform district-speciﬁct r a n s f e r( i . e . ,si = sj for all i, j).
3 The social planner’s solution
To establish a normative benchmark with which to compare the political equilibrium, we begin by
describing the policies that would be chosen by a social planner whose objective was to maximize
aggregate utility. This is basically the problem considered by Aiyagari et al (2002). However,
we will derive the solution in a way that sets the stage for the more complicated analysis of the
political equilibrium.6
The planner’s problem can be formulated recursively. The state of the economy is summarized
by the current level of public debt b and the value of the public good A.L e tv(b,A) denote maximal
average citizen expected utility (net of the value of initial bond holdings) at the beginning of a
period in which the state is (b,A).7 Then, in a period in which the state is (b,A), the planner’s








i si ≤ B(r,g,x;b), si ≥ 0 for all i,a n dx ∈ [x,x].
(6)
The three constraints are the feasibility constraints described in section 2.2.
6 Aiyagari et al allow for more general preferences, focusing on the quasi-linear case as a leading example. This
complicates the model because interest rates are aﬀected by government policy. These complications require them
to use a less transparent solution method.
7 Maximal average expected utility will be b(1 + ρ)/n + v(b,A).
7This problem can be simpliﬁed by observing that if the net of transfer surplus B(r,g,x;b)
were positive, the planner would use it to ﬁnance transfers and hence
X
i si = B(r,g,x;b). Thus,
we can eliminate the choice variables (s1,....,sn) and reformulate the problem as choosing a tax
rate-public good-public debt triple (r,g,x)t os o l v e :
max u(w(1 − r),g;A)+
B(r,g,x;b)
n + δEv(x,A0)
s.t. B(r,g,x;b) ≥ 0a n dx ∈ [x,x].
(7)
The problem in this form is fairly standard. The planner’s value function must satisfy the func-
tional equation





+δEv(x,A0):B(r,g,x;b) ≥ 0& x ∈ [x,x]}. (8)
Familiar arguments can be applied to show that such a value function exists and that Ev(·,A)
is diﬀerentiable and strictly concave. From this, the properties of the optimal policies may be
deduced.
3.1 The optimal policies
Using equations (3) and (4) and letting λ denote the multiplier on the budget constraint, we can
write the ﬁrst order conditions for the maximization problem in (8) as follows:
1+λ =
1 − r












]( =i f x<x). (11)
To interpret these, note that (1 − r)/(1 − r(1 + ε)) measures the marginal cost of taxation - the
social cost of raising an additional unit of revenue via a tax increase. It exceeds unity whenever
the tax rate (r) is positive, because taxation is distortionary. For a given tax rate, the marginal
cost of taxation is higher the more elastic is labor supply; that is, the higher is ε. Condition (9)
therefore says that the beneﬁt of raising an additional unit of revenue - which is measured by 1+λ -
must equal the marginal cost of taxation. Condition (10) says that the marginal social beneﬁt
of the public good must equal its price times the marginal cost of taxation. This is basically the
8Samuelson Rule modiﬁed to take into account the fact that taxation is distortionary. Condition
(11) says that the beneﬁt of increasing debt in terms of reducing taxes must equal the marginal
cost of an increase in the debt level. This cost is that there is a higher initial level of debt next
period. The condition can hold as an inequality, if the debt level is at its ceiling.
In any particular state (b,A), there are two possibilities. The ﬁrst is that the planner is making
transfers to the citizens in which case λ = 0. In this case, conditions (9) and (10) imply that the
tax rate r must be zero and the level of the public good g must equal the Samuelson level gS(A).
Intuitively, if r were positive, the planner would ﬁnd it strictly optimal to simultaneously reduce
transfers and the tax rate: this would reduce the deadweight loss of taxation and increase citizen
welfare. Similarly, if the public good level were less than the Samuelson level, then the planner
could reduce transfers and increase public good provision. The debt level in this case, which we
denote by xo, must satisfy the requirement that the expected marginal cost of borrowing equals
1. We will investigate what this implies below.
The second possibility is that the planner is making no transfers. In this case, the optimal tax
rate-public good-public debt triple is implicitly deﬁned by equations (10), (11) and the requirement
that the net of transfer surplus is zero; i.e.,
B(r,g,x;b)=0 . (12)
A positive value of λ implies that the tax rate r must exceed zero and the level of the public good
g is less than the Samuelson level gS(A). Moreover, the level of debt exceeds xo.T h et a xr a t ea n d
debt level are increasing in b and A, while the public good level is decreasing in b and increasing
in A.8 Intuitively, an increase in b makes the budget harder to satisfy forcing the planner to
raise more revenues and skimp on the public good. An increase in A makes the public good more
valuable and leads the planner to raise taxes and debt to ﬁnance more public spending.
In which states will the two possibilities arise? Let Ao(b,xo)b et h el a r g e s tv a l u eo fA consistent
with the triple (0,g S(A),x o) satisfying the constraint that B(0,g S(A),x o;b) ≥ 0.9 Then, if the
state (b,A) is such that A<A o(b,xo), the optimal policy involves transfers, while if A ≥ Ao(b,xo)
it does not.
8 These facts are established in the appendix.
9 If B(0,0,x o;b) < 0, let Ao(b,xo)=0 .
93.2 The debt level xo
The next step is to characterize the debt level xo the planner chooses when he makes transfers.
Intuitively, if the planner is willing to rebate scarce revenues back to citizens then he must expect
not to be imposing taxes in the next period otherwise he would be better oﬀ reducing transfers
and acquiring more bonds. This suggests that the debt level xo must be such that future taxes
are equal to zero, implying that xo equals x. This is indeed the case but it is instructive to derive
it formally.
Recall that xo is such that the expected marginal cost of borrowing equals 1. Given the above
discussion, we can write the value function as
v(x,A)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨












if A ≥ Ao(x,xo)
u(w,gS(A);A)+
B(0,gS(A),xo;x)
n + δEv(xo,A 0)i f A<A o(x,xo)
.
(13)











n )i f A ≥ Ao(x,xo)
−(
1+ρ
n )i f A<A o(x,xo)
, (14)
where ro(x,A) is the optimal tax rate. Notice that this derivative is continuous at A = Ao(x,xo)










1 − ro(x,A)(1 + ε)
)dG(A). (15)






1 − ro(xo,A)(1 + ε)
)dG(A). (16)
This implies that Ao(xo,x o)=A, which in turn means that xo = x.
3.3 Dynamics
The optimal policies determine a distribution of public debt levels in each period. In the long run,
this sequence of debt distributions converges to the distribution that puts point mass on the debt
level x.T ou n d e r s t a n d t h i s ,ﬁrst note that since Ao(x,x)=A, it is clear that once the planner
10has accumulated a level of bonds equal to −x, he will maintain it. On the other hand, when the
planner has bond holdings less than −x then he must anticipate using distortionary taxation in
the future. To smooth taxes he has an incentive to acquire additional bonds when the value of
the public good is low in the current period. This leads to an upward drift in goverment bond
holdings over time.
Pulling all this together, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The social planner’s solution converges to a steady state in which the debt level is
x,t h et a xr a t ei s0, the public good level is gS(A), and citizens receive ρ(−x)−pgS(A) in transfers.
This result illustrates in the context of our model the problem with the tax smoothing approach
identiﬁed by Aiyagari et al. Though the planner can not issue state contingent bonds, he can
smooth taxation across states by accumulating assets. As shown by Aiyagari et al. by numerical
methods, this phenomenon is general and can characterize the planner’s solution under less re-
strictive assumptions on the functional forms of the citizens’ utilities and the stochastic process
of government spending.
One way to avoid the absorbing state in which x = x is to assume that the social planner faces
what Aiyagari et al. call “ad hoc” constraints on asset accumulation. If the planner is not allowed
to accumulate more bonds than, say, −z where z ∈ (x,0 ) ,t h e ne v e ni nt h el o n gr u nt h eo p t i m a l
debt level will ﬂuctuate and taxes will be positive at least some of the time.10 This is because,
by deﬁnition of x, even when the planner has accumulated −z in bonds he can not ﬁnance the
Samuelson level of public goods from the interest earnings when A is very high. In these high
realizations, it will be optimal to ﬁnance additional public good provision by a combination of
levying taxes and reducing bond holdings. Reducing bond holdings temporarily allows the planner
to smooth taxes. The dynamic pattern of debt suggested by Barro is created by the rebuilding of
bond holdings in future periods when A is low. However, the diﬃculty with this resolution of the
problem is obvious: why should the planner be so constrained and, if he is, what should determine
the level z?
10 In order for taxes to be always positive it must be the case that ρ(−z) <p g S(A).
114 The political equilibrium
We look for a symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium in which any representative selected to pro-
pose at round τ ∈ {1,...,T} of the meeting at some time t makes the same proposal and this
depends only on the current level of public debt (b) and the value of the public good (A).11
As standard in the theory of legislative voting, we assume that legislators vote for a proposal if
they prefer it (weakly) to continuing on to the next proposal round.12 We focus, without loss of
generality, on equilibria in which at each round τ, proposals are immediately accepted by at least
q legislators, so that on the equilibrium path, no meeting lasts more than one proposal round.
Accordingly, the policies that are actually implemented in equilibrium are those proposed in the
ﬁrst round.
Let {r(b,A), g(b,A), x(b,A)} denote the tax rate, public good and public debt policies that
are implemented in equilibrium and let B(b,A) be the total amount of revenues devoted to trans-
fers (i.e., B(b,A)=B(r(b,A),g(b,A),x(b,A);b)). In addition, let v(b,A) denote the legislators’
common (net of initial bond holdings) value function. Reﬂecting the fact that legislators are ex




+ δEv(x(b,A),A 0). (17)
This is also the (net of initial bond holdings) value function for each citizen, since as noted earlier,
representatives have the same policy preferences as their constituents.13
We restrict attention to a particular type of equilibrium, which we refer to as a “well-behaved
11 A Markov-perfect equilibrium is a particular type of subgame perfect equilibrium in which strategies do not
depend on payoﬀ irrelevant past events. By focusing on Markov-perfect equilibria we rule out, for example, equilibria
in which proposers punish earlier proposers for not providing their districts with transfers. Markov games (such as
the game studied here) generally have a large set of subgame perfect equilibria and the Markov-perfect requirement
allows us to dramatically shrink this set. Non Markov equilibria are often supported by complex strategies, or by
strategies that (even when they are simple) require unrealistic degrees of coordination from the players. Markov
equilibria do not require coordination and are very simple. The idea of simplicity has been formalized by Baron
and Kalai (1992) for the static Baron and Ferejohn game. Given a standard deﬁnition of simplicity (Kalai and
Stanford (1988)), they have shown that the unique simplest equilibrium of this game is stationary (i.e., Markov).
Stationarity is also supported in a recent laboratory experiment. Frechette, Kagel and Morelli (2005) have shown
that there is no evidence of of non stationary behavior in the data of their experimental study of the Baron and
Ferejohn game.
12 As in all voting games, it is possible to construct equilibria in which legislators vote against a proposal even
if they strictly prefer it to continuing on to the next proposal round. If all voters always vote no to a proposal
and there are three or more voters, then no voter will be pivotal and voting no will be weakly optimal no matter
what preferences are. These equilibria are implausible and uninteresting. This assumption on legislators’ voting
behavior rules them out.
13 The expected lifetime payoﬀ of a citizen with bond holdings y at the beginning of a period in which the state
is (b,A) will be y(1 + ρ)+v(b,A).
12equilibrium”. To deﬁne what this is, call the interval of debt levels [inf(b,A) x(b,A),x]t h epolicy
domain. Levels of debt outside this range will never be observed except when exogenously assumed
at date zero. An equilibrium is said to be well-behaved if the associated legislators’ value function
satisﬁes the following three properties: (i) v is continuous on the state space, (ii) for all A, v(·,A)
is concave on [x,x]a n dEv(·,A) is strictly concave on the policy domain, and (iii) for all b, v(·,A)
is diﬀerentiable at b for almost all A. In the Appendix, we demonstrate:
Proposition 2. There exists a unique well-behaved equilibrium.
This is the equilibrium that we characterize in the sequel.
4.1 The equilibrium policies
The basic structure of the equilibrium policies is easily understood. To get support for his proposal,
the proposer must obtain the votes of q − 1 other representatives. Accordingly, given that utility
is transferable, he is eﬀectively making decisions to maximize the utility of q legislators.14 It is
therefore as if a randomly chosen coalition of q representatives is selected in each period and this
coalition chooses a policy choice to maximize its aggregate utility.
The proposer’s policy will depend upon the state (b,A). As in the social planner’s solution,
there are two possibilities: either the proposer will propose transfers for his coalition or he will
not. Because the proposer is only taking into account the welfare of q legislators and transfers
are ﬁnanced collectively, his incentive to choose transfers is obviously greater than the planner’s.
Nonetheless, transfers require reducing public good spending or increasing taxation in the present
o rt h ef u t u r e( i fﬁnanced by issuing additional debt). When b and/or A are suﬃciently high, the
marginal beneﬁt of spending on the public good and the marginal cost of increasing taxation may
be too high to make this attractive. In this case, the proposer will not propose transfers and the
outcome will be as if the proposer is maximizing the utility of the legislature as a whole.
In equilibrium, therefore, there will exist a cut-oﬀ value of the public good, inversely related
to the level of public debt, that divides the state space into two ranges. Above the cut-oﬀ,t h e
proposer will propose a no-transfer policy package that maximizes aggregate legislator utility. This
proposal will be supported by the entire legislature. Below the cut-oﬀ, the proposer chooses a
policy package that provides pork for his own district and those of a minimum winning coalition
14 This is demonstrated formally in the appendix.
13of representatives. The transfer paid out to coalition members will be just suﬃcient to make them
favor accepting the proposal. Thus, only those legislators whose districts receive pork vote for the
proposal. We will refer to the ﬁrst regime as responsible-policy-making (RPM) and the second as
business-as-usual (BAU).
To develop this more precisely, consider the problem of choosing the tax rate-public good-
public debt triple that maximizes the collective utility of q representatives under the assumption
that they divide the net of transfer surplus among their districts and that the constraint that this
surplus be non-negative is non-binding. Formally, the problem is:
max(r,g,x) u(w(1 − r),g;A)+
B(r,g,x;b)
q + δEv(x,A0)
s.t. x ∈ [x,x].
(18)
Using the ﬁrst-order conditions for this problem, the solution is (r∗,g∗(A),x ∗) where the tax rate



















]( =i f x∗ < x). (21)
Condition (19) says that the beneﬁt of raising taxes in terms of increasing the per-legislator
transfer (1/q) must equal the per-capita cost of the increase in the tax rate. Condition (20) says
that the per-capita beneﬁt of increasing the public good must equal the per-legislator reduction in
transfers that providing the additional unit necessitates. Condition (21) tells us that the beneﬁt
of increasing debt in terms of increasing the per-legislator transfer must equal the per-capita cost
of an increase in the debt level.
Now deﬁne A∗(b,x)t ob et h el a r g e s tv a l u eo fA consistent with the triple (r∗,g∗(A),x)
satisfying the constraint that B(r∗,g∗(A),x;b) ≥ 0.15 Then, if the state (b,A)i ss u c ht h a t
A<A ∗(b,x∗), the proposer proposes the triple (r∗,g∗(A),x ∗)t o g e t h e rw i t hat r a n s f e rj u s ts u ﬃ-
cient to induce members of the coalition to accept the proposal and the legislature is in the BAU
15 If B(r∗,0,x;b) < 0, let A∗(b,x)=0 .
14regime. If A>A ∗(b,x∗), then the constraint that B(r,g,x;b) ≥ 0 must bind and the solution
equals that which maximizes aggregate legislator utility. The legislature is therefore in the RPM
regime. Thus, we have:












and B(b,A)=0 ,w h i l ei fA<A ∗(b,x∗)
(r(b,A),g(b,A),x(b,A)) = (r∗,g∗(A),x ∗)
and B(b,A) > 0.
In the RPM regime (i.e., when A ≥ A∗(b,x∗)), just as in the social planner’s solution, the
equilibrium tax rate-public good-public debt triple is implicitly deﬁned by conditions (10), (11)
and (12) (obviously, with the equilibrium value function). Thus, as in the planner’s problem, the
tax rate and debt level are increasing in b and A, while the public good level is decreasing in b
and increasing in A.
Note that at A = A∗(b,x∗) the triple that maximizes aggregate legislator utility equals
(r∗,g∗(A),x ∗). To see this, note ﬁr s tt h a t( r∗,g∗(A),x ∗)s a t i s ﬁes the budget balance condition
(12) at A = A∗(b,x∗). In addition, using the deﬁnition of r∗ in (19) we may write the ﬁrst order
conditions (20) and (21) in the same form as (10) and (11). Thus, the equilibrium policy proposal
is a continuous function of the state (b,A). Moreover, given the monotonicity properties of the
solution in the RPM regime, it follows that when A>A ∗(b,x∗), the equilibrium policy proposal
involves a tax rate higher than r∗, the provision of a public good level below g∗(A), and a level
of debt that exceeds x∗. Thus, in the political equilibrium, the government’s debt level is always
at least x∗,t h et a xr a t ei sa l w a y sa tl e a s tr∗, and the public good level is always no greater than
g∗(A).
4.2 The debt level x∗
The next step is to characterize the debt level x∗ that the proposer chooses when providing pork
to his coalition. We use a similar strategy to that used to characterize xo in the planner’s problem.
15From Lemma 1 we know that, in equilibrium,
v(x,A)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨












if A ≥ A∗(x,x∗)
u(w(1 − r∗),g∗(A);A)+
B(r∗,g∗(A),x∗;x)
n + δEv(x∗,A 0)i f A<A ∗(x,x∗)
.
(22)











n )i f A ≥ A∗(x,x∗)
−(
1+ρ
n )i f A<A ∗(x,x∗)
. (23)
In contrast to the planner’s solution, there is a discontinuity in the derivative of the value function
when A = A∗(x,x∗). This reﬂects the fact that the tax rate r(x,A∗)e q u a l sr∗ and hence the
marginal cost of taxation strictly exceeds 1. Intuitively, a higher future level of debt reduces pork
if the legislature is in the BAU regime and increases taxes if the legislature is in the RPM regime.
I n c r e a s i n gt a x e si sm o r ec o s t l yt h a nr e d u c i n gp ork because taxes are positive in RPM and thus
the marginal cost of public funds exceeds 1.
Using this expression to compute the expected marginal cost of borrowing and using our ﬁrst
order condition (21), we ﬁnd that x∗ must satisfy
n
q





1 − r(x∗,A)(1 + ε)
)dG(A)( =i f x∗ < x). (24)
Our assumption concerning the maximum debt level x implies that A∗(x,x) <A .T h u s , s i n c e
taxes exceed r∗ in the RPM regime, the expected marginal social cost of debt must exceed n/q
when x∗ = x. It follows that x∗ is strictly less than x and condition (24) must hold as an equality.
Notice that for condition (24) to be satisﬁed, A∗(x∗,x ∗)m u s tl i es t r i c t l yb e t w e e nA and A.
Intuitively, this means that the debt level x∗ must be such that the legislature will transition out
of BAU with positive probability and stay in it with positive probability. This has important
implications for the magnitude of x∗ which we will draw out below.
4.3 Dynamics
The equilibrium policies determine a distribution of public debt levels in each period. In the
Appendix, we show that this sequence of debt distributions converges to a unique invariant dis-
tribution. Thus, no matter what the economy’s initial debt level, the same distribution of debt
16emerges in the long run. The lower bound of the support of this distribution is x∗ -t h el e v e l
of public debt chosen in the BAU regime. There is a mass point at this debt level, since the
probability of remaining at x∗ having reached it is G(A∗(x∗,x ∗)) - which is positive. However,
the distribution of debt is non-degenerate because, as just noted, x∗ must be such that there is a
positive probability of leaving the BAU regime.
Combining this with our earlier discussion, yields the following proposition:
Proposition 3. The equilibrium debt distribution converges to a unique invariant distribution
whose support is a subset of [x∗,x]. This distribution has a mass point at x∗ but is non-degenerate.
When the debt level is x∗,t h et a xr a t ei sr∗, the public good level is g∗(A), and a minimum winning
coalition of districts receive transfers. When the debt level exceeds x∗, the tax rate exceeds r∗,t h e
public good level is less than g∗(A), and no districts receive transfers.
The dynamics of the equilibrium are such that, in the long-run, legislative policy-making
oscillates between BAU and RPM. Periods of BAU are brought to an end by high realizations of
the value of public goods. These trigger an increase in debt and taxes to ﬁnance higher public
good spending and a cessation of pork-barrel spending. Once in the RPM regime, further high
realizations of the value of the public good trigger further increases in debt and higher taxes.
Policy-making returns to BAU only after a suitable sequence of low realizations of the value of
t h ep u b l i cg o o d .T h el a r g e rt h ea m o u n to fd e b tt h a th a sb e e nb u i l tu p ,t h eg r e a t e rt h ee x p e c t e d
time before returning to BAU.
To get a graphical feel for the long run dynamics of the system, let AL be less than A∗(x∗,x ∗)
and AH be larger than A∗(x∗,x ∗). Suppose that the legislature is in BAU in period t −1s ot h a t
the level of debt is x∗ at the beginning of period t. Further suppose that in periods t through
tL the value of the public good is AL;i np e r i o d stL +1t h r o u g htH the value of the public good
is AH;a n di np e r i o d stH + 1 and beyond the value of the public good returns to AL. Then, the
dynamic pattern of debt, tax rates and public good provision is as represented in Figure 1. At
date tL + 1 debt, taxes and public good levels jump up in response to the increase in A.D u r i n g
periods tL +1t h r o u g htH, debt and taxes continue to rise, while public good provision falls. In
period tH + 1, public good provision drops in response to the fall in A, overshooting its natural
level g∗(AL). After period tH +1, debt and taxes start to fall and public good provision increases.
Eventually, the legislature returns to BAU.
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Figure 1: The dynamics of the political equilibrium.
If the debt level x∗ is positive, the economy is in perpetual debt, with the extent of debt spiking
up after a sequence of high values of the public good. When x∗ is negative, the government will
have positive asset holdings at least some of the time. A key question is therefore what determines
the magnitude of x∗. As noted earlier, x∗ must be such that the legislature will transition out of
BAU with positive probability and stay in it with positive probability. We now use this observation
to shed light on the determinants of x∗.
Given the deﬁnition of the function A∗, the critical value A∗(x∗,x ∗)s a t i s ﬁes the equation
R(r∗)−ρx∗ = pg∗(A). Thus, since A∗(x∗,x ∗) must lie between A and A,i fR(r∗) exceeds pg∗(A)
then x∗ must be positive. Intuitively, if x∗ were equal to zero, the legislature would be in BAU
with probability one so interest payments must be positive to soak up some of the surplus revenues.
18On the other hand, if R(r∗)i sl e s st h a npg∗(A)t h e nx∗ must be negative. If x∗ were equal to
zero, the legislature would be in RPM with probability one so interest earnings must be positive
to supplement scarce tax revenues. The key determinant of the magnitude of x∗ is therefore the
size of the tax base as measured by R(r∗) relative to the economy’s desired public good spending
as measured by pg∗(A) .T h eg r e a t e rt h er e l a t i v es i z eo ft h et a xb a s e ,t h el a r g e ri st h ed e b tl e v e l
chosen in the BAU regime. Paradoxically, therefore, it is economies with relatively larger tax bases
that are more likely to be in perpetual debt.
5 Political distortions
A central mission of the contemporary literature on political economy is to understand how po-
litical decision-making distorts policy choices. Propositions 1 and 3 tell us precisely how the
equilibrium policy sequence diﬀers from the planner’s policy sequence. Speciﬁcally, in the long
run, the level of debt held by the government is too high relative to the optimal level, tax rates are
too high, and public good levels are too low. Moreover, tax rates are too volatile. Since in both
the planner’s solution and the equilibrium all citizens receive the same expected utility (modulo
any diﬀerences in initial bond holdings), these distortions mean that the political equilibrium is
Pareto dominated by the planner’s solution. Thus, the equilibrium exhibits “political failure” in
the sense deﬁned by Besley and Coate (1998).
This ineﬃciency not withstanding, in the RPM regime, legislators behave exactly as the social
planner would want them given the constraint that future policy choices are politically determined.
This suggests the intriguing idea that the equilibrium policies might solve an appropriately con-
strained planning problem. The following proposition makes this idea precise.
Proposition 4. The equilibrium value function v(b,A) solves the functional equation
v(b,A)=m a x (r,g,x){u(w(1 − r),g;A)+
B(r,g,x;b)
n + δEv(x,A0):
B(r,g,x;b) ≥ 0, r ≥ r∗, g ≤ g∗(A), & x ∈ [x∗,x]},
and the equilibrium policies {r(b,A), g(b,A), x(b,A)} are the optimal policy functions for this
program.
Comparing the program described in the proposition with that in (8), we see that political
determination imposes three constraints on the planning problem. First, the tax rate cannot be
19below r∗. W e r ei tt ob es o ,t h ep r o p o s e rc o u l db e n e ﬁt his coalition by raising the income tax
rate and dividing the proceeds among coalition members. Second, the public good level cannot be
above g∗(A). If it were, the proposer could beneﬁt his coalition by reducing public good spending
and dividing the proceeds among coalition members. Third, the debt level cannot be below x∗.
If it were, the proposer could beneﬁt his coalition by borrowing more and dividing the proceeds
among coalition members.
The proposition is interesting because it tells us that political determination can be interpreted
as imposing additional constraints on the planner’s problem, rather than fundamentally changing
t h en a t u r eo fﬁscal policy. The result aﬃrms that the principles of tax smoothing operate even
when the assumption of a benevolent government is relaxed. Indeed, since the constraints serve to
break the unpalatable implication of zero taxation in the long run, adding political determination
increases the relevance of the basic tax smoothing idea. The result also helps develop intuition
on the nature of the political equilibrium: the planner’s problem in the tax smoothing context
is already reasonably well understood and it is relatively straightforward to think through the
consequences of the additional constraints.
The proposition makes clear that political economy considerations give rise to distortions in
taxes and public good spending as well as in debt. Importantly, the equilibrium policy choices are
not the same as those obtained from the tax smoothing problem with a constraint that the govern-
ment’s debt level must exceed x∗ (which is the problem studied by Aiyagari et al). Constraints on
the tax rate and public good level must also be imposed for the solution to be declared a positive
prediction. The distortions in the tax rate and the public good level are static distortions in the
sense that within any period in which the constraints are binding aggregate citizen welfare would
be higher if the tax rate were reduced and the public good level increased. The distortion in the
debt level is a dynamic distortion in the sense that the future beneﬁts to citizens from lower debt
oﬀset the costs of lower revenues in the present.
There are two basic reasons for the distortions arising from political decision-making. First,
the fact that q is less than n means that the decisive coalition does not fully internalize the costs
of raising taxes or reducing public good spending. If the legislature operated by unanimity rule
(i.e., q = n) then legislative decision-making would reproduce the planner’s solution. This follows
immediately from Proposition 4 once it is noted that with q = n,t h et a xr a t er∗ is 0, the public
good level g∗(A)i sj u s tt h eS a m u e l s o nl e v e lgS(A), and the debt level x∗ is x. More generally,
20moving from majority to super-majority rule will improve welfare since raising q reduces r∗ and
x∗ and raises g∗(A), thereby relaxing the constraints on the planning problem.
Second, the random allocation of proposal power in the legislature creates uncertainty about
the identity of the minimum winning coalition. If the proposer is making transfers to his coalition
and anticipates that the legislature will be in BAU the next period, this uncertainty means that
he will always want to issue more debt. Issuing an additional dollar of debt would gain 1/q units
for each legislator in the minimum winning coalition and would lead to a one unit reduction in
pork in the next period. This has an expected cost of only 1/n because members of the current
minimum winning coalition are not sure they will be included in the next period. The critical role
of uncertainty can be appreciated by noting that if the identity of the minimum winning coalition
were constant through time the resulting equilibrium policy sequence would be Pareto eﬃcient.16
6 Empirical implications of the theory
Our theory has two types of empirical implications. First, for a given economy, it has implica-
tions for the pattern of debt, taxes, public spending and legislative voting behavior.17 Second,
comparing across economies, it provides predictions on how the distributions of debt, taxes and
public spending should vary with the underlying fundamentals.
For a given economy, the most obvious implication of the theory concerns the impact of an
increase in the value of public goods as a result, say, of a war or natural disaster. Recall that
the equilibrium public good level is strictly increasing in A, while the equilibrium tax and debt
levels are constant in A in the BAU regime and and increasing in the RPM regime. Moreover, a
suﬃciently high realization of A must shift the equilibrium from BAU to RPM. Thus, the theory
predicts that we should observe increases in debt, taxes and public good spending following a
signiﬁcant increase in the value of public goods. This prediction is consistent with the fact that
historically the debt/GDP ratio in the U.S. and the U.K. tends to have increased in periods of
high government spending needs and decreased in periods of low needs (Barro (1979), (1986), and
16 It is relatively straightforward to ﬁnd the equilibrium in this “oligarchic” case in which a constant coalition
of q representatives choose policy. The economy would converge to a deterministic steady state in which the tax
rate is r∗, the public good level is g∗(A), and the debt level is such that ρ(−x)+R(r∗) ≥ pg∗(A). Excess revenues
would be shared by the q representatives.
17 In light of Proposition 4, these implications are obviously going to be similar to those of a tax smoothing
model with an “ad hoc” limit on bond accumulation.
21(1987)). The theory also suggests that we should see a reduction in pork-barrel spending and
an increase in the size of majorities passing budget bills. While there are issues here concerning
the empirical measurement of pork, it would be well worth trying to investigate these auxiliary
predictions.
The theory also has implications for how the equilibrium policies should depend on the current
stock of debt. Recall that the equilibrium public good level is constant in b in the BAU regime
and decreasing in the RPM regime, while the equilibrium tax and debt levels are constant in b
in BAU and increasing in RPM. Moreover, the economy is more likely to be in RPM the higher
is b. Combining these observations, it is possible to derive some interesting implications for the
relationship between what is known as the “primary surplus” and the level of debt. The primary
surplus is the diﬀerence between tax revenues and public spending other than interest payments.
In our model, it is the diﬀerence between tax revenues and spending on the public good and
pork. Using the budget constraint, we may write this as PS(b,A)=( 1+ρ)b − x(b,A). To
understand what happens to the primary surplus when debt increases, consider a small increase
∆b in b while holding A constant. If the legislature is in BAU, then because x(b,A) is constant,
∆PS(b,A)/∆b =( 1+ρ) .O nt h eo t h e rh a n d ,i ft h el e g i s l a t u r ei si nR P M ,t h e n∆PS(b,A)/∆b =
(1 + ρ) − ∆x(b,A)/∆b which is positive but less than 1 + ρ since x(b,A)i si n c r e a s i n gi nb but
at a rate smaller than 1 + ρ.18 In both cases, therefore, the relationship between the primary
surplus and debt is positive, but the eﬀect is smaller in the RPM regime. The ﬁrst implication
is consistent with the work of Bohn (1998) who ﬁnds that for the U.S. federal government the
relationship between the primary surplus and debt is positive. However, since the economy is
more likely to be in the RPM regime when b is high, the second implication is inconsistent with
Bohn’s ﬁnding that the relationship is convex. It seems plausible that x(b,A)m i g h tb ec o n c a v e
in the RPM regime which would yield Bohn’s ﬁnding for suﬃciently high levels of debt but,
unfortunately, this is not something that can be established analytically.
With respect to the impact of the current debt level, the theory also has an interesting impli-
cation for winning margins in the legislature. The expected size of the coalition voting in favor of
the winning proposal with debt level b is G(A∗(b,x∗))q +( 1− G(A∗(b,x∗))n, which is increasing
in b. Thus, the winning margin on budget bills should be increasing in the current debt level. This
18 This follows from the facts that in the RPM regime x(b,A)+R(r(b,A)) equals (1 + ρ)b + pg(b,A), r(b,A)i s
increasing in b,a n dg(b,A)i sd e c r e a s i n gi nb.
22is a novel prediction which is well worth investigating.
Comparing across economies, the model has three groups of underlying parameters: preference
parameters which include the labor supply elasticity ε, the discount rate δ, and the distribution
of public good values G(A); technological parameters which consist of labor productivity w and
the price of public goods p;a n dinstitutional parameters which consist of the number of districts
n and the size of the majorities required to pass legislation q. For any given set of parameters, the
model predicts a unique long run distribution of debt and associated distributions of tax rates,
public good spending, and voting coalitions. In principle, therefore, it is possible to explore how
changes in each of these parameters impact these distributions. For example, one could ask how
moving from a high to a low productivity economy would impact the distribution of debt. This
type of comparative static exercise could be quite valuable as it would allow the development
of predictions concerning cross country (or state) debt distributions which is something the tax
smoothing model has trouble explaining (see Alesina and Perotti (1995) and Roubini and Sachs
(1989)). Unfortunately, however, it is something that appears diﬃcult to do analytically. Thus,
it requires computing a calibrated version of the equilibrium which, while feasible, would take us
well beyond the scope of this paper.19
Not withstanding the diﬃculties in characterizing the comparative statics, it is possible to
make some general informed speculations based on what we know about the underlying logic of
the model. The key equilibrium variable is x∗ - the level of debt that is chosen in the BAU regime.
As we have explained, x∗ adjusts to ensure that in BAU the economy transitions to RPM with
a probability which is positive but less than one. The equilibrium debt distribution has a mass
point at x∗ a n di ts e e m sl i k e l yt h a ti fx∗ increases, the debt distribution will shift rightward. We
have identiﬁed the relative size of the tax base as being the key factor in the determination of x∗.
Thus, parameters that raise R(r∗)r e l a t i v et oEpg∗(A) would seem likely to raise the average level
of debt. This suggests that the average level of debt will be decreasing in ε, q/n, and rightward
shifts in G(A), and increasing in w.
While we are not aware of empirical evidence on the relationship between debt levels and
our speciﬁc parameters, there is a literature investigating the relationship between ﬁscal policy
and political variables in the OECD countries.20 A central theme of this literature is that a
19 We are currently working on computing the model with co-author Marina Azzimonti.
20 Our theory is designed to apply to political systems (like the U.S.) in which political parties are relatively
23“fragmented” policy-making process leads to present-biased ﬁscal outcomes. Inﬂuenced by the
“common pool” view of ﬁscal policy (see section 8 below for discussion), Perotti and Kontopoulos
(2002) deﬁne fragmentation “as the degree to which individual ﬁscal policy-makers internalize
the costs of one dollar of aggregate expenditure”. Using a number of empirical measures of this
variable, they have shown that it is positively correlated with higher deﬁcits.21 In our model, as
we argued in section 4.1, ﬁscal policy is eﬀectively chosen collectively in each period by a coalition
of q randomly chosen representatives. Thus, the sole “ﬁscal policy-maker” is the group of q
representatives and this group internalizes q/n of the cost of any dollar of spending. Accordingly,
a prediction that average debt levels are increasing in q/n would appear consonant with this
literature.
7 An application of the theory
To illustrate the potential usefulness of the theory for policy analysis, we brieﬂy explore its impli-
cations for the desirability of balanced budget requirements. There has been considerable debate
in academic and policy circles concerning this issue.22 M a n yo ft h eU . S .s t a t e sh a v es o m ef o r m
of balanced budget requirement and there is evidence that they do have an eﬀect.23 Proponents
argue that they dampen politicians’ ability to borrow to spend inappropriately. Opponents point
out that they restrict the state’s ability to adjust to revenue and spending shocks without having
to raise taxes. Both positions seem reasonable, but to provide sharper policy guidance it is nec-
essary to understand the features of the environment that determine when the beneﬁts outweigh
the potential costs.24
We consider a ﬁscal restraint that requires the legislature to ensure that tax revenues equal
weak and legislators care a great deal about bringing resources back to their districts. Since the strength of parties
and the importance of pork barrel spending in motivating legislators seems to vary signiﬁcantly across the OECD
countries, the U.S. states may be the most natural place to look to test the cross economy implications of the theory.
That said, in the spirit of Alesina and Tabellini (1990), it is possible to interpret the n legislators as distinct political
parties and the pork-barrel spending as transfers to party constituents. The coalition of q legislators choosing policy
in each period could then be interpreted as that election cycle’s governing coalition.
21 See also Roubini and Sachs (1989) and Volkerink and de Haan (2001) for related ﬁndings.
22 For relevant discussion see Bohn and Inman (1996), Brennan and Buchanan (1980), Niskanen (1992), Poterba
(1994), (1995), Poterba and von Hagen (1999) and Primo (2007).
23 For example, Poterba (1994) shows that states with restraints were quicker to reduce spending and/or raise
taxes in response to negative revenue shocks than those without.
24 There appears to be surprisingly little welfare analysis of ﬁscal restraints beyond the original work of Brennan
and Buchanan (1980). Besley and Smart (2007) provide a general treatment of restraints in the context of a
two period political agency model. Bassetto and Sargent (2006) study the welfare case for separating capital and
ordinary government budgets and allowing the government to issue debt only to ﬁnance capital items.
24public spending in every period. We assume that in the ﬁrst period the government begins with no
debt (i.e., b0 = 0), so that spending is just on public goods and transfers. We seek to understand
when citizens’ welfare will be enhanced by the constraint that public spending be ﬁnanced solely
by tax revenues.
Let (rc(A),g c(A)) denote the equilibrium tax rate and public good level when the value of the








n : B(r,g,0;0) ≥ 0} if A ≥ A∗(0,0)
(r∗,g∗(A)) if A<A ∗(0,0)
.
(25)
Thus, if A<A ∗(0,0), the legislature is in the BAU regime and districts receive pork, while if
A ≥ A∗(0,0), the legislature is in the RPM regime. The solution is stationary because government
cannot issue debt or acquire bonds. If vc(A) denotes citizen expected utility under the balanced
budget requirement given that the current value of the public good is A,t h e n








[u(w(1 − rc(A)),g c(A);A)+
B(rc(A),g c(A),0;0)
n
]dG(A)/(1 − δ). (27)
As in section 4, let {r(b,A), g(b,A), x(b,A)} denote the tax rate, public good and public
debt policies that are implemented in the unconstrained equilibrium and let v(b,A)d e n o t et h e
legislator’s value function. Starting from a situation in which the government has no debt, citizen
expected utility in the unconstrained equilibrium is Ev(0,A). Thus, a balanced budget require-
ment will be desirable if and only if Evc(A) >E v (0,A).
Our ﬁrst result is that when the revenues raised by the tax rate r∗ are never suﬃcient to cover
the cost of the optimal level of public goods, a balanced budget requirement is not desirable.
Proposition 5. If R(r∗) ≤ pg∗(A), a balanced budget requirement is not desirable.
To see this, recall from section 4.3 that the condition of the proposition implies that x∗ must be
non-positive, so that in the BAU regime, the winning proposals involve the purchase of bonds.
These bond holdings allow the legislature to lower taxes and provide higher levels of public goods
25in the long run. Moreover, the legislature only issues debt in the RPM regime which means that
borrowing will be used only when it will raise aggregate utility. Such borrowing must therefore
be socially beneﬁcial.
An interesting feature of this case, is that under a balanced budget requirement, the legislature
never engages in pork barrel spending. (This follows from the fact that the condition implies that
A∗(0,0) ≤ A.) By contrast, in the unconstrained equilibrium, the legislature does provide pork
in the BAU regime. Thus, the balanced budget requirement is undesirable despite eliminating
transfers. This underscores the lesson that there is nothing necessarily undesirable about transfers
- indeed, in the planner’s solution the government redistributes excess revenues from its interest
earnings back to the citizens in each period.
Our second result is the mirror image of the ﬁrst: when the revenues raised by the tax rate r∗
are always suﬃcient to cover the cost of the optimal level of public goods when the tax rate is r∗,
a balanced budget requirement is desirable.
Proposition 6. If R(r∗) ≥ pg∗(A), a balanced budget requirement is desirable.
To see this, note that with a balanced budget restraint, the equilibrium will involve the tax rate
r∗ and the public good level g∗(A) in every period. Without the restraint, the equilibrium will
involve the legislature immediately borrowing x∗ and using the revenues to ﬁnance extra pork.
The amount x∗ must be suﬃciently large that in future periods there is positive probablity that
the tax rate will exceed r∗ and the public good level will be less than g∗(A). There is no oﬀsetting
beneﬁt, and hence eliminating the government’s ability to borrow, increases citizen welfare.
If R(r∗) is between pg∗(A)a n dpg∗(A) but x∗ is nonpositive, then the argument underlying
Proposition 4 remains and imposing a balanced budget requirement will be harmful. However,
if x∗ is positive the picture is murkier because there are oﬀsetting eﬀects from imposing the
requirement. On the one hand, the government does not need to service the debt and hence long
run taxes and public good levels must be lower on average with the requirement. On the other,
the government’s ability to smooth tax rates and public good levels by varying the debt level is
lost.
Intuitively, it seems natural to suppose that th el a r g e rt h es i z eo ft h et a xb a s ea sm e a s u r e db y
R(r∗) the more likely is a balanced budget requirement to be desirable. After all, the larger the
tax base, the less the need to borrow to meet desired public good spending and the greater the
26debt level that will need to be ﬁnanced when there is no restraint. This idea can be investigated
formally by noting that the size of R(r∗) is determined by the magnitude of the private sector wage
w. From (4), we see that R(r∗)e q u a l spg∗(A)i fa n do n l yi fw =[ pg∗(A)/nr∗εε(1−r∗)ε]
1
1+ε.T h u s ,




1+ε,w em o v et h e
size of the tax base through the interval (pg∗(A),pg∗(A)). Our conjecture is that there must exist
a critical wage w∗ greater than [pg∗(A)/nr∗εε(1−r∗)ε]
1
1+ε but less than [pg∗(A)/nr∗εε(1−r∗)ε]
1
1+ε
such that a balanced budget requirement is desirable if and only w exceeds w∗. Unfortunately,
however, the argument that this is indeed the case has so far proven elusive.
To summarize: the theory suggests the key determinant of the desirability of a balanced budget
requirement is the size of the tax base relative to the economy’s desired public good spending.
When this size is large, a balanced budget requirement is a good idea and when it is small, the
opposite conclusion holds. The relative size of the tax base will be reﬂected in the magnitude of
the debt level that is chosen in the BAU regime. Thus, the theory supports the common sense
conclusion that economies with large and perpetual deﬁcits should introduce balanced budget
requirements.
8 Related political economy literature
This paper is related to two established branches of the political economy literature.25 The ﬁrst
concerns the implications of pork-barrel spending for the eﬃciency of legislative policy-making.
In a well-known paper, Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen (1981) argue that pork-barrel spending
will lead to a government that is too large. They do not model the process of passing legislation,
assuming instead that legislative policy-making is governed by a “norm of universalism”. Under
this norm, each legislator unilaterally decides on the level of spending he would like on projects
in his own district and the aggregate level of taxation is determined by the need to balance the
budget. Policy-making then becomes a pure common pool problem.
More recently, the bargaining approach of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) has emerged as the
standard way to model legislative decision making and a number of papers have employed it
to study the eﬃciency implications of pork-barrel spending.26 In a one period model, Baron
25 For excellent reviews of this literature see Drazen (2000) and Persson and Tabellini (2000).
26 The main criticism of the common pool perspective is that it does not model the voting process. For game
theoretic approaches that are alternatives to Baron-Ferejohn, see Chari and Cole (1995) and Morelli (1999). For
27(1991) shows that legislators may propose projects whose aggregate beneﬁts are less than their
costs, when these beneﬁts can be targeted to particular districts.27 This is because the decisive
coalition does not fully internalize the costs of ﬁnancing projects. In a similar static framework,
Volden and Wiseman (2007) study the allocation of a ﬁxed budget between public goods and
pork barrel spending and show that public goods will be under-provided in some circumstances.
In the context of a ﬁnite horizon dynamic model, LeBlanc, Snyder and Tripathi (2000) argue
that legislatures will under-invest in public capital. In their model, in each period a legislature
allocates a ﬁxed amount of revenue between targeted transfers and a public investment that serves
to increase the amount of revenue available in the next period.28
The second related branch of political economy literature is that discussing public debt. This
literature oﬀers two main explanations for why governments may run deﬁcits even when there is
no social role for so doing. Following Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen (1981), the ﬁrst explana-
tion is based on viewing the accumulation of public debt as a dynamic common pool problem
(see, for example, Inman (1990) and von Hagen and Harden (1995)). A formal model of this
type is developed by Velasco (2000). While there is no economic role for debt in his model, he
demonstrates the existence of an equilibrium in which deﬁcits and debt accumulation continue
unabated until the government’s debt ceiling is reached. Chari and Cole (1993) present a related
two period model, where legislators facing a common pool problem that drives spending too high
try to restrain second period spending by issuing excessive levels of debt in the ﬁrst period.
The second explanation is based on political instability. The basic idea is that when politicians
choose current policy, they realize that with some probability they will not be choosing policy in
the future. This may induce too much borrowing because the costs in terms of future spending
cuts are not fully internalized. This idea was introduced independently by Alesina and Tabellini
(1990) and Persson and Svensson (1989). Alesina and Tabellini consider a model in which in each
period, two political parties hold oﬃce with exogenous probability. There are two goods that
experimental studies of the Baron and Ferejohn model, see Frechette, Kagel and Morelli (2005) who study the
classic static divide-the-dollar version, and Battaglini and Palfrey (2007) who study a dynamic version.
27 Related models are elaborated by Austen-Smith and Banks (2005) and Persson and Tabellini (2000).
28 As noted in the introduction, our earlier paper (Battaglini and Coate (2007)) also explores how pork barrel
spending distorts investment in public capital goods. Our model diﬀers from LeBlanc et al in that it is an inﬁnite
h o r i z o nm o d e li nw h i c ht h eg o v e r n m e n tc a nl e v yt a x e sa swell as allocate public revenues and public investment
yields beneﬁts for more than one period. We ﬁnd conditions under which the equilibrium size of government is too
large and the level of public goods too low but also show that there are conditions under which legislative decisions
are eﬃcient and/or government is too small.
28may be publicly-provided, but each party’s constituency values only one. The government may
ﬁnance public provision with debt and/or distortionary taxation. In each period, the winning
party chooses taxes, debt and how much to spend on the good its constituency cares about.
Alesina and Tabellini present conditions under which the steady state debt level is positive even
though the optimal debt level is zero. Persson and Svensson consider a two period model featuring
two political parties who diﬀer in their preferences on the level of spending. Spending is ﬁnanced
by debt and distortionary taxes. They show that the party who prefers less spending may run a
deﬁcit in the ﬁrst period to constrain the spending choices of the second period government.29
While both these arguments require policy-motivated political parties, Lizzeri (1999) shows
that the same logic works even in a world with Downsian parties. He considers a two period
economy in which elections are held at the beginning of each period. Parties can make binding
promises before the elections as to how they will redistribute the available resources across voters
and over time. Rational voters reward myopic behavior, however, favoring a party promising to
distribute all resources today, because resources left for the future may be spent on others by the
opposing party if the ﬁrst period incumbent is not re-elected. Lizzeri refers to the force generating
the present bias as “redistributive uncertainty”.
It is evident that the arguments underlying the political distortions in our model are similar
to those made in these two branches of the political economy literature. The static distortions in
taxes and public goods parallel those that emerge in other legislative bargaining models with pork
barrel spending and the logic of the dynamic distortion is similar to that underlying the various
models of political instability. As noted in the introduction, what is novel about our analysis is
that we incorporate these types of forces into a tax smoothing model in which there is a social role
for debt.30 Our analysis thus provides insights into how economic and political considerations
interact to determine the dynamic pattern of ﬁscal policy. Rather than seeing political economy
models as alternatives to the tax smoothing model, our work shows how the two approaches can
be proﬁtably integrated to reduce the shortcomings of each approach individually taken.
The objective of incorporating political decision making into a tax smoothing model is also
29 An incumbent government may also want to choose debt issue strategically for another reason; namely, to
inﬂuence its likelihood of re-election. This argument is developed by Aghion and Bolton (1990).
30 Corsetti and Roubini (1997) introduce a motive for tax smoothing into a two period version of the Alesina
and Tabellini (1990) model. They show in numerical simulations that the eﬀect of this motive on the ﬁrst period
deﬁcit is largely independent of the political incentives to run deﬁcits as measured by the probability that the ﬁrst
period incumbent is re-elected.
29shared by the recent work of Yared (2007). However, he analyzes the complete market version of
the tax smoothing model due to Lucas and Stokey (1983) in which state contingent debt is avail-
able. He also adopts a more stylized model of the political process than us, assuming that citizens
choose the income tax rate but that a self-interested, inﬁnitely-lived ruler chooses borrowing and
allocates the budget between public goods, his own consumption, and debt repayment. He looks
at non Markov equilibria, in which citizens punish the ruler by levying no taxes if he “abuses” his
executive power and the ruler punishes the citizens by underfunding public goods if they provide
too little revenue. To solve the problem of multiple subgame perfect equilibria, he assumes that
players can coordinate on equilibria on the Pareto frontier and the bulk of his analysis focuses
on the equilibrium which maximizes the citizens’ welfare - the “eﬃcient sustainable equilibrium”.
In the spirit of our Proposition 4, he shows that it is possible to represent this equilibrium as
the solution of a particular constrained planner’s problem.31 His main ﬁnding is that eﬃcient
sustainable taxes and debt respond more persistently to shocks than do taxes and debt in Lucas
and Stokey’s planning problem. Thus, political constraints may explain why an economy with
complete markets may behave as observed in the empirical literature (and predicted by Barro’s
incomplete markets tax smoothing model).
9 Conclusion
This paper has presented a dynamic theory of public spending, taxation and debt. The the-
ory brings together ideas from the optimal taxation and political economy literatures. From the
former, the theory adopts the basic framework underlying the tax smoothing approach to ﬁscal
policy. From the latter, the theory incorporates pork barrel spending and employs the legislative
bargaining approach to modelling policy-making. The result is a tractable dynamic general equi-
librium model that yields a rich set of predictions concerning the dynamics of ﬁscal policy and
permits a rigorous analysis of the normative properties of equilibrium policies.
There are numerous ways the theory might usefully be extended. A particularly interesting
extension would be to introduce cyclical ﬂuctuations in tax revenues due to the business cycle.
31 Yared’s work draws on Acemoglu, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006a) who characterize eﬃcient sustainable equilib-
ria in a dynamic economy with a self-interested ruler. However, their model is a dynamic Mirrlees model rather than
a tax smoothing model. Like Yared, they demonstrate that it is possible to represent the eﬃcient sustainable equi-
librium as the solution to a planner’s problem with constraints. Acemoglu, Golosov and Tysvinski (2006b) present
a similar result for a simpler economic model with a richer political process in which political power ﬂuctuates
between distinct social groups.
30This could be achieved by specifying a stochastic process (with persistence) for the private sector
wage. Such a model would deliver predictions concerning the cyclical behavior of ﬁscal policy.
While the tax smoothing paradigm suggests that deﬁcits might be observed in recessions and
surpluses in booms, observed ﬁscal policy is often procyclical (Alesina and Tabellini (2005)). It
would be interesting to know what the type of theory developed here predicts.
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3410 Appendix
10.1 Proof of Proposition 1
From the analysis in the text we know that if A ≤ Ao(b,x) the planner would select a tax rate
of 0, a public good level of gS(A), a debt level of x,a n dt r a n s f e rB(0,g S(A),x;b) to the citizens.
Since Ao(x,x)=A, it follows that once the planner has selected the debt level x the economy
enters a deterministic steady state in which the debt level is x, the tax rate is 0, the public good
level is gS(A), and citizens receive ρ(−x)−pgS(A) in transfers. Thus, it only remains to show that
whatever the initial debt level, the planner will eventually select the debt level x with probability
one. We will establish this following the proof of Proposition 4 below. ¥
10.2 Deﬁnition of political equilibrium
As background for the analysis to follow, we need to provide a more precise deﬁnition of political
equilibrium. An equilibrium is described by a collection of proposal functions: {rτ(b,A), gτ(b,A),
xτ(b,A), sτ(b,A)}T
τ=1.H e r erτ(b,A)i st h ei n c o m et a xr a t et h a ti sp r o p o s e da tr o u n dτ when the
state is (b,A); gτ(b,A) is the level of the public good; xτ(b,A) is the new level of public debt, and
sτ(b,A)i sat r a n s f e rt h ep r o p o s e ro ﬀers to the districts of q−1 randomly selected representatives.32
Any remaining surplus revenues are used to ﬁnance a transfer for the proposer’s own district.
Following the notation used in Section 4, we will sometimes drop the subscript and refer to the
ﬁrst round policy proposal as {r(b,A), g(b,A), x(b,A), s(b,A)}.
The collection of proposal functions {rτ(b,A), gτ(b,A), xτ(b,A), sτ(b,A)}T
τ=1 is an equilibrium
if at each proposal round τ and all states (b,A), the prescribed proposal maximizes the proposer’s
payoﬀ subject to the incentive constraint of getting the required number of aﬃrmative votes and
the appropriate feasibility constraints. To state this formally, let vτ(b,A) denote the legislators’
value function at round τ which describes the expected future payoﬀ of a legislator at the beginning
o fap e r i o di nw h i c ht h es t a t ei s( b,A). Again, following the notation of Section 4, we refer to the
value function at round 1 as v(b,A). Then, for each proposal round τ and all states (b,A), the
32 It should be clear that there is no loss of generality in assuming that the proposer only oﬀers transfers to q−1
representatives.
35proposal (rτ(b,A), gτ(b,A), xτ(b,A), sτ(b,A)) must solve the problem
max
(r,g,x,s)
u(w(1 − r),g;A)+B(r,g,x;b) − (q − 1)s + δEv(x,A0)
s.t. u(w(1 − r),g;A)+s + δEv(x,A0) ≥ vτ+1(b,A),
B(r,g,x;b) ≥ (q − 1)s, s ≥ 0&x ∈ [x,x].
The ﬁrst constraint is the incentive constraint and the remainder are feasibility constraints. The
formulation reﬂects the assumption that on the equilibrium path, the proposal made in the ﬁrst
proposal round is accepted.
As noted in the text, the legislators’ round one value function is deﬁn e dr e c u r s i v e l yb y( 1 7 ) .
To understand this recall that a legislator is chosen to propose in round one with probability 1/n.
If chosen to propose, he obtains a payoﬀ in that period of
u(w(1 − r(b,A)),g(b,A);A)+B(r(b,A),g(b,A),x(b,A);b) − (q − 1)s(b,A).
If he is not chosen to propose, but is included in the minimum winning coalition, he obtains u(w(1−
r(b,A)),g(b,A);A)+s(b,A) and if he is not included he obtains just u(w(1−r(b,A)),g(b,A);A).
The probability that he will be included in the minimum winning coalition, conditional on not
being chosen to propose, is (q −1)/(n−1). Taking expectations, the pork barrel transfers s(b,A)
cancel and the period payoﬀ is as described in (17).
Once we have the round one value function, the other value functions can be readily derived.
For all proposal rounds τ =1 ,..,T − 1 the expected future payoﬀ of a legislator if the round τ
proposal is rejected is




This reﬂects the assumption that the round τ + 1 proposal will be accepted. Recall that if the
round T proposal is rejected, the assumption is that a legislator is appointed to choose a default
tax rate, public goods level, level of debt and a uniform transfer. Thus,






+ δEv(x,A0):B(r,g,x;b) ≥ 0&x ∈ [x,x]
¾
.
3610.3 Proof of Lemma 1
We begin by establishing the claim made in the text that, given that utility is transferable, the
proposer is eﬀectively making decisions to maximize the collective utility of q legislators under the
assumption that they get to divide any surplus revenues among their districts.
Lemma A.1: Let {rτ(b,A), gτ(b,A), xτ(b,A), sτ(b,A)}T
τ=1 be an equilibrium with associated value
function v(b,A). Then, for all states (b,A), the tax rate-public good-public debt triple (rτ(b,A),
gτ(b,A), xτ(b,A)) proposed in any round τ solves the problem
max(r,g,x) u(w(1 − r),g;A)+
B(r,g,x;b)
q + δEv(x,A0)
s.t. B(r,g,x;b) ≥ 0&x ∈ [x,x].
Moreover, the transfer to coalition members is given by
sτ(b,A)=vτ+1(b,A) − u(w(1 − rτ(b,A),g τ(b,A);A) − δEv(xτ(b,A),A 0).
Proof: W eb e g i nw i t hp r o p o s a lr o u n dT.L e t( b,A) be given. Multiplying the objective function
through by q, we need to show that if (rT,s T,g T,x T)s o l v e st h er o u n dT proposer’s problem when
the state is (b,A), (rT,g T,x T) solves the problem
max(r,g,x) q[u(w(1 − r),g;A)+δEv(x,A0)] + B(r,g,x;b)
s.t. B(r,g,x;b) ≥ 0&x ∈ [x,x]
, (A.1)




u(w(1 − r),g;A)+B(r,g,x;b) − (q − 1)s + δEv(x,A)
s.t. u(w(1 − r),g;A)+s + δEv(x,A) ≥ vT+1(b,A),
B(r,g,x;b) ≥ (q − 1)s, s ≥ 0&x ∈ [x,x].
It is easy to see that sT = vT+1(b,A)−δEv(xT,A 0)−u(w(1−rT),g T;A), for if this were not the
case it would follow from the deﬁnition of vT+1(b,A)t h a tsT > 0 and we could create a preferred
proposal by just reducing sT. It follows that we can write the proposer’s payoﬀ as
q [u(w(1 − rT),g T;A)+δEv(xT,A 0)] + B(rT,g T,x T;b).
Now suppose that (rT,g T,x T) does not solve problem (A.1). Let (r0,g0,x 0)s o l v ep r o b l e m
(A.1) and s0 = vT+1(b,A) − u(w(1 − r0),g0;A) − δEv(x0,A 0). Then, the proposer’s payoﬀ under
37the proposal (r0,g0,x 0,s 0)i sq [u(w(1 − r0),g0;A)+δEv(x0,A 0)] + B(r0,g0,x 0;b). By construction,
the incentive constraint is satisﬁed and, by deﬁnition of vT+1(b,A), s0 ≥ 0. Moreover, x0 ∈ [x,x].
Finally, note that
B(r0,g0,x 0;b) − (q − 1)s0 =( q − 1)[u(w(1 − r0),g0;A)+δEv(x0,A 0)] + B(r0,g0,x 0;b)
−(q − 1)vT+1(b,A) ≥ 0
where the last inequality follows from the fact that (r0,g0,x 0) solves problem (A.1) and the deﬁn-
ition of vT+1(b,A). It follows that (r0,g0,x 0,s 0) is feasible for the proposer’s problem and yields a
higher payoﬀ than (rT,g T,x T,s T) - a contradiction.
Now consider the round T − 1 proposer’s problem
max
(r,g,x,s)
u(w(1 − r),g;A)+B(r,g,x;b) − (q − 1)s + δEv(x,A0)
s.t. u(w(1 − r),g;A)+s + δEv(x,A0) ≥ vT(b,A),
B(r,g,x;b) ≥ (q − 1)s, s ≥ 0&x ∈ [x,x].
(A.2)
From what we know about the round T proposer’s problem,




where (rT,g T,x T) solves problem (A.1).
We need to show that if (rT−1,s T−1,g T−1,x T−1) is the solution to the round T −1 proposer’s
problem, (rT−1,g T−1,x T−1)s o l v e sp r o b l e m( A . 1 )a n d
sT−1 = vT(b,A) − u(w(1 − rT−1),g T−1;A) − δEv(xT−1,A 0).
The result would follow from our earlier argument if we could show that
sT−1 = vT(b,A) − u(w(1 − rT−1),g T−1;A) − δEv(xT−1,A 0),
so suppose that sT−1 >v T(b,A)−u(w(1−rT−1),g T−1;A)−δEv(xT−1,A 0). Then it must be the
case that sT−1 = 0, or we could obtain a preferred proposal by simply reducing sT−1. It follows
that
vT(b,A) <u (w(1 − rT−1),g T−1;A)+δEv(xT−1,A 0). (A.3)




s.t. B(r,g,x;b) ≥ 0&x ∈ [x,x].
Now consider the proposal (rT,g T,x T,
B(rT,gT,xT;b)
n ). Clearly, this proposal satisﬁes all the
constraints of the proposer’s problem. The payoﬀ to the proposer under this policy is
q[u(w(1 − rT),g T;A)+δEv(xT,A 0)] + B(rT,g T,x T;b) − (q − 1)vT(b,A).
From (A.3), this payoﬀ is strictly larger than
q[u(w(1 − rT),g T;A)+δEv(xT,A)] + B(rT,x T,g T;b)
−(q − 1)[u(w(1 − rT−1),g T−1;A)+δEv(xT−1,A)].
The payoﬀ to the proposer under the optimal policy (rT−1,g T−1,x T−1)i s
u(w(1 − rT−1),g T−1;A)+B(rT−1,x T−1,g T−1;b)+δEv(xT−1,A).
Thus, it must be the case that
u(w(1 − rT−1),g T−1;A)+B(rT−1,x T−1,g T−1;b)+δEv(xT−1,A 0)
>q [u(w(1 − rT),g T;A)+δEv(xT,A 0)] + B(rT,x T,g T;b)
−(q − 1)[u(w(1 − rT−1),g T−1;A)+δEv(xT−1,A 0)],
implying that
q[u(w(1 − rT−1),g T−1;A)+δEv(xT−1,A 0)] + B(rT−1,x T−1,g T−1;b)
>q [u(w(1 − rT),g T;A)+δEv(xT,A 0)] + B(rT,x T,g T;b).
This contradicts the fact that (rT,g T,x T)s o l v e sp r o b l e m( A . 1 ) .
Application of the same logic to proposal rounds τ = T − 2,...,1 implies the lemma. ¥
Using this result, we can prove:
Lemma A.2: Let {rτ(b,A), gτ(b,A), xτ(b,A), sτ(b,A)}T
τ=1 be an equilibrium with associated
value function v(b,A). Then, there exists some debt level x∗ such that for any proposal round τ if
39A ≥ A∗(b,x∗)











and sτ(b,A)=0 ,while if A<A ∗(b,x∗)










n if τ =1 ,....,T − 1
vT+1(b,A) − u(w(1 − r∗,g∗(A);A) − δEv(x∗,A 0)i f τ = T
.
Proof: The argument in Section 4.1 of the paper together with Lemma A.1 implies that for any
proposal round τ if A ≥ A∗(b,x∗)












while if A<A ∗(b,x∗)
(rτ(b,A),g τ(b,A),x τ(b,A)) = (r∗,g∗(A),x ∗).
Turning to the equilibrium transfers, it is clear that, since there are no surplus revenues when
A ≥ A∗(b,x∗), transfers are zero. If A<A ∗(b,x∗) it follows that for all proposal rounds τ =










B(r∗,g∗(A),x ∗;b)/n τ =1 ,...,T − 1
vT+1(b,A) − u(w(1 − r∗,g∗(A);A) − δEv(x∗,A 0) τ = T
.
¥
Lemma 1 now follows immediately from Lemma A.2.
4010.4 Properties of the equilibrium policy functions
In this section we establish some properties of the equilibrium (and optimal) policy functions that
are mentioned in the text and that will be used in the following proofs.
We ﬁr s ts h o wt h a tw h e nA ≥ A∗(b,x∗) , the tax rate, public debt level and the level of the
public good depend positively on the value of the public good (A), the tax rate and level of
public debt depend positively on the current level of debt (b) and the level of the public good
depends negatively on b. From Lemma A.2 we know that when A ≥ A∗(b,x∗), the equilibrium
tax rate-public good-public debt triple (rτ(b,A),g τ(b,A),x τ(b,A)) solve
max(r,g,x) u(w(1 − r),g;A)+
B(r,g,x;b)
n + δEv(x,A0)
s.t. B(r,g,x;b) ≥ 0&x ∈ [x,x]
.
Moreover, from the discussion in the text, (rτ(b,A),g τ(b,A),x τ(b,A)) is implicitly deﬁned by
equations (10), (11) and (12) in Section 3.1 (with the appropriate equilibrium value function).
Lemma A.3: Let b ∈ [x,x] and let A0,A 1 ∈ [A,A] be such that A∗(b,x∗) <A 0 <A 1.T h e n ,i t
is the case that gτ(b,A0) <g τ(b,A1) and rτ(b,A0) <r τ(b,A1). Moreover, it is also the case that
xτ(b,A0) ≤ xτ(b,A1) with strict inequality if xτ(b,A0) < x.
P r o o fo fL e m m aA . 3 :We begin by showing that gτ(b,A0) <g τ(b,A1). Let ϕ(A0;b,A)b et h e
value of the objective function for the problem when the state is A0 and the policies are those that





T h e n ,w eh a v et h a tϕ(A0;b,A0) >ϕ (A0;b,A1)a n dϕ(A1;b,A1) >ϕ (A1;b,A0) (the strict inequal-
ity follows from the fact that the problem has a unique solution).
Moreover, using the deﬁnition of the indirect utility function u(w(1−r),g;A) (see equation (3)
in Section 2) and letting ∆A = A1 − A0,w ec a nw r i t eϕ(A0;b,A0)=ϕ(A1;b,A0) − ∆Agτ(b,A0)
and ϕ(A0;b,A1)=ϕ(A1;b,A1)−∆Agτ(b,A1). Since ϕ(A0;b,A0) >ϕ (A0;b,A1), this means that
ϕ(A1;b,A0) − ∆Agτ(b,A0) >ϕ (A1;b,A1) − ∆Agτ(b,A1), and hence
∆A[gτ(b,A0) − gτ(b,A1)] <ϕ (A1;b,A0) − ϕ(A1;b,A1) < 0.
Since ∆A>0, this implies that gτ(b,A0) <g τ(b,A1) as required.
41We next show that rτ(b,A0) <r τ(b,A1). Suppose to the contrary that rτ(b,A0) ≥ rτ(b,A1).
Then the ﬁrst order condition for x (i.e., (11)) and the concavity of Ev(·,A)i m p l yt h a txτ(b,A0) ≥
xτ(b,A1) .B u tt h e ni tf o l l o w st h a t
B(rτ(b,A0),g τ(b,A0),x τ(b,A0);b) >B (rτ(b,A1),g τ(b,A1),x τ(b,A1);b)=0
which is a contradiction.
Finally, we show that xτ(b,A0) ≤ xτ(b,A1) with strict inequality if xτ(b,A0) < x. This follows
immediately from the ﬁrst order condition for x and the concavity of v given that rτ(b,A0) <
rτ(b,A1). ¥
Lemma A.4: Let b0,b 1 ∈ [x,x] be such that b0 <b 1 and let A ∈ [A,A] be such that A∗(b0,x ∗) <A .
Then, it is the case that rτ(b0,A) <r τ(b1,A) and gτ(b0,A) >g τ(b1,A). Moreover, it is also the
case that xτ(b0,A) ≤ xτ(b1,A) with strict inequality if xτ(b0,A) < x.
P r o o fo fL e m m aA . 4 :We ﬁrst show that rτ(b0,A) <r τ(b1,A). Suppose to the contrary that
rτ(b0,A) ≥ rτ(b1,A). Then the ﬁrst order conditions for g and x (i.e., (10) and (11)) and the
concavity of Ev(·,A)i m p l yt h a tgτ(b0,A) ≤ gτ(b1,A)a n dxτ(b0,A) ≥ xτ(b1,A). But then it
follows that
B(rτ(b0,A),g τ(b0,A),x τ(b0,A);b0) >B (rτ(b1,A),g τ(b1,A),x τ(b1,A);b1)=0
which is a contradiction.
The fact that gτ(b0,A) >g τ(b1,A) follows immediately from the ﬁrst order condition for g
and the fact that rτ(b0,A) <r τ(b1,A). In addition, the fact that xτ(b0,A) ≤ xτ(b1,A) with strict
inequality if xτ(b0,A) < x follows immediately from the ﬁrst order condition for x (i.e., (11)), the
concavity of Ev(·,A) and the fact that rτ(b0,A) <r τ(b1,A). ¥
10.5 Proof of Proposition 2
We begin by proving the existence of an equilibrium. The proof is divided into seven steps.





.L e tF∗ be the subset of these functions that are continuous and concave in x for
all A. For any z ∈ [
R(r∗)−pg∗(A)
ρ ,x]a n dv ∈ F∗ consider the maximization problem
max(r,g,x) u(w(1 − r),g;A)+
B(r,g,x;b)
n + δEv(x,A0)
s.t. B(r,g,x;b) ≥ 0, r ≥ r∗, g ≤ g∗(A)&x ∈ [z,x]
.
42For all µ>0, let
Xµ




+ δEv(x,A0):x ∈ [z,x]}
and let xµ
z(v) be the largest element of the compact set Xµ
z (v). Notice that xµ
z(v) is non-increasing
in µ.
Suppose that (r,g,x) is a solution to the maximization problem. It is straightforward to show
that (i) if A ≤ A∗(b,xn
z(v)) then (r,g)=( r∗,g∗(A)) and x ∈ Xn
z (v) ∩ {x : B(r∗,g∗(A),x;b) ≥ 0};
(ii) if A ∈ (A∗(b,xn
z(v)),A ∗(b,xq
z(v))] then (r,g)=( r∗,g∗(A)) and B(r∗,g∗(A),x;b) = 0; and (iii)
if A>A ∗(b,xq
z(v)) (r,g,x) is uniquely deﬁned and the budget constraint is binding. Moreover,
r>r ∗ and g<g ∗(A). Note that in all cases the tax rate and public good level are uniquely
deﬁned.
Step 2: For any z ∈ [
R(r∗)−pg∗(A)
ρ ,x], deﬁne the operator Tz : F∗ → F as follows:













It can be veriﬁed that Tz(v) ∈ F∗ and that Tz is a contraction. Thus, there exists a unique
ﬁxed point vz(b,A) which is continuous and concave in b for all A.T h i sﬁxed point satisﬁes the
functional equation













Let (b,A) be given and let (r,g,x) denote an optimal policy. By Step 1, we have that (i) if
A ≤ A∗(b,xn
z(vz)) then (r,g)=( r∗,g∗(A)) and x ∈ Xn
z (vz) ∩ {x : B(r∗,g∗(A),x;b) ≥ 0}; (ii)
if A ∈ (A∗(b,xn
z(vz)),A ∗(b,xq
z(vz))] then (r,g)=( r∗,g∗(A)) and B(r∗,g∗(A),x;b) = 0; and (iii)
if A>A ∗(b,xq
z(vz)) (r,g,x)i su n i q u e l yd e ﬁned and the budget constraint is binding. Moreover,
r>r ∗ and g<g ∗(A). Again, in all cases the tax rate and public good level is uniquely deﬁned.
Let these be given by (rz(b,A),g z(b,A)) - these are also continuous functions on the state space.











Proof: It suﬃces to show that for any v ∈ F∗, the function ETz(v)(·,A) is strictly concave on
the set {b ∈ [x,x]:A∗(b,xq
z(v)) < A}. Since Tz(v) ∈ F∗, we know already that the function
43Tz(v)(·,A)i sc o n c a v ef o ra l lA.W e n o w s h o w t h a t f o r a l l A,t h ef u n c t i o nTz(v)(·,A)i ss t r i c t l y
concave on {b ∈ [x,x]:A∗(b,xq
z(v)) <A }. In this case, the budget constraint is strictly binding
and gz(b,A) <g ∗(A), rz(b,A) >r ∗. We can therefore write:












Take two points b1 and b2 in the set {b ∈ [x,x]:A∗(b,xq
z(v)) < A} and assume that b1 <b 2.L e tλ
be a point in the interval [0,1]. Deﬁne (ri,g i,x i) to be the optimal policies associated with (bi,A)
for i =1 ,2 (as noted above these are unique). Let bλ = λb1 +( 1− λ)b2, rλ = λr1 +( 1− λ)r2,
gλ = λg1 +( 1− λ)g2 and xλ = λx1 +( 1− λ)x2.S i n c e v(x,A0)+x/n is weakly concave in x,






u(w(1 − r1),g 1;A)
+
B(r1,g1,x1;b1)








u(w(1 − r2),g 2;A)
+
B(r2,g2,x2;b2)








Since R(r)i sc o n c a v ei nr,w eh a v et h a tB(rλ,g λ,x λ;bλ) > 0 and, in addition, xλ ∈ [z,x].
Therefore:

















We conclude that λTz(v)(b1,A)+( 1− λ)Tz(v)(b2,A) <T z(v)(bλ,A)a sr e q u i r e d .
Now take any two points b1 and b2 in the set {b ∈ [x,x]:A∗(b,xq
z(v)) < A} and assume that











































Step 4: For any z ∈ [
R(r∗)−pg∗(A)
ρ ,x], let
M(z)=a r gm a x {
x
q




Then there exists z∗ ∈ [
R(r∗)−pg∗(A)
ρ ,x] such that z∗ ∈ M(z∗).
Proof: The result follows from Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem if M(z) is non-empty, upper
hemi-continuous, and convex and compact-valued. We have:
Claim: M(z) is non-empty, upper hemi-continuous, and convex and compact-valued.
Proof: Let Fz denote the set of all bounded and continuous real valued functions ϕ(·,·,·)d e ﬁned
over the compact set [
R(r∗)−pg∗(A)




.D e ﬁne the operator:












It is easy to verify that Ψ maps Fz into itself and is a contraction. Thus, it has a unique ﬁx-
point ϕ∗ = Ψ(ϕ∗)w h i c hb e l o n g st oFz.N o w n o t e t h a t f o ra n y z ∈ [
R(r∗)−pg∗(A)
ρ ,x], vz(b,A)=
ϕ∗(z,b,A). To see this, note that for any given z, ϕ∗(z,b,A) ∈ F∗,s ow ec a nd e ﬁne Tz (ϕ∗(z,b,A)).
The deﬁnition of ϕ∗, however, implies Tz (ϕ∗(z,b,A)) = ϕ∗(z,b,A). Since Tz has a unique ﬁxpoint,
it must be that vz(b,A)=ϕ∗(z,b,A).
Given this, we conclude that vz(b,A) is continuous in z and the Theorem of the Maximum
then implies that M(z) is non-empty, upper hemi-continuous, and compact-valued. Convexity of
M(z) follows from the fact that Evz(x,A) is weakly concave. ¥
Step 5: Let z∗ be such that z∗ ∈ M(z∗). Then, x
q
z∗(vz∗)=z∗.
45Proof: By deﬁnition, x
q
z∗(vz∗) is the largest element in the set X
q
z∗(vz∗). By construction, z∗













z∗(vz∗), then it must be the case that z∗ <x
q











This implies that the expected value function Evz∗(·,A) is linear on the interval [z∗,x
q
z∗(vz∗)].
However, we know that
x
q
z∗(vz∗) >z ∗ ≥
R(r∗) − pg∗(A)
ρ
which implies that pg∗(A)+ρx
q




z∗(vz∗)) < A.B y




z∗(vz∗)] such that for all
x in this interval A∗(x,x
q
z∗(vz∗)) < A. But by Step 3, the expected value function Evz∗(·,A)i s
strictly concave on the interval [x0,x
q
z∗(vz∗)] - a contradiction.
Step 6: Let z∗ be such that z∗ ∈ M(z∗). Then, the function vz∗(·,A)i sd i ﬀerentiable for all b











n )i f A>A ∗(b,z∗)
−(
1+ρ
n )i f A<A ∗(b,z∗)
.
Proof: Let A ∈ [A,A]a n dl e txo be given. By Step 5, we know that x
q
z∗(vz∗)=z∗ which
immediately implies that xn
z∗(vz∗)=z∗.S u p p o s eﬁrst that A<A ∗(xo,z∗). Then, we have that












Now suppose that A>A ∗(xo,z∗). Then, we know that the budget constraint is binding, and
that the constraints r ≥ r∗ and g ≤ g∗(A) are not binding. Thus, we have that in a neighborhood
46of xo that







n + δEvz∗ (y,A0)













+ δEvz∗ (xz∗(xo,A),A 0).
Notice that (rz∗(xo,A),g(x),x z∗(xo,A)) is a feasible policy when the initial debt level is x so that







p )2 < 0
The second derivative property implies that η(x) is strictly concave. It follows from Theorem




















which implies that αnAgz∗(xo,A)α−1 = p[
1−rz∗(xo,A)










Step 7: Let z∗ be such that z∗ ∈ M(z∗). Then, the following constitutes an equilibrium. For
each proposal round τ
(rτ(b,A),g τ(b,A),x τ(b,A)) = (rz∗(b,A),g z∗(b,A),x z∗(b,A));
for proposal rounds τ =1 ,...,T − 1
sτ(b,A)=B(rz∗(b,A),g z∗(b,A),x z∗(b,A);b)/n;
47and for proposal round T
sT(b;A)=vT+1(b,A) − u(w(1 − rz∗(b,A)),g z∗(b,A);A) − δEvz∗(xz∗(b,A),A 0);
where













Proof: Given these proposals, the legislators’ round one value function is given by vz∗(b,A). This
follows from the fact that




Similarly, the round τ =2 ,...,T legislators’ value function vτ(b,A)i sg i v e nb yvz∗(b,A). It follows
from Steps 3 and 4 that the value function vz∗(b,A) has the properties required for an equilibrium









u(w(1 − r),g;A)+B(r,g,x;b) − (q − 1)s + δEvz∗(x;A0)
s.t. u(w(1 − r),g;A)+s + δEvz∗(x;A0) ≥ vz∗(b;A),
B(r,g,x;b) ≥ (q − 1)s, s ≥ 0&x ∈ [x,x],
and (ii) that for proposal round T the proposal




u(w(1 − r),g;A)+B(r,g,x;b) − (q − 1)s + δEvz∗(x;A0)
s.t. u(w(1 − r),g;A)+s + δEvz∗(x;A0) ≥ vT+1(b,A),
B(r,g,x;b) ≥ (q − 1)s, s ≥ 0&x ∈ [x,x],
We show only (i) - the argument for (ii) being analogous.
48Consider some proposal round τ =1 ,...,T − 1. Let (b,A) be given. To simplify notation, let










s.t. B(r,g,x;b) ≥ 0&x ∈ [x,x],
and that b s = vz∗(b,A)−u(w(1−b r),b g;A)−δEvz∗(b x;A0). Suppose that (b r,b g,b x,b s)d o e sn o ts o l v et h e
round τ proposer’s problem. Then there exist some (r0,g0,x 0,s 0) which achieves a higher value of
the proposer’s objective function. We know that s0 ≥ vz∗(b;A)−u(w(1−r0),g0;A)−δEvz∗(x0;A0).
Thus, we have that the value of the proposer’s objective function satisﬁes
u(w(1 − r0),g0;A)+B(r0,g0,x 0;b) − (q − 1)s0 + δEvz∗(x0;A0)
≤ q[u(w(1 − r0),g0;A)+δEvz∗(x0;A0)] + B(r0,g0,x 0;b).
But since B(r0,g0,x 0;b) ≥ 0, we know that
q[u(w(1 − r0),g0;A)+δEvz∗(x0;A0)] + B(r0,g0,x 0;b)
≤ q[u(w(1 − b r),b g;A)+δEvz∗(b x;A0)] + B(b r,b g,b x;b).
But the right hand side of the inequality is the value of the proposer’s objective function under
the proposal (b r,b g,b x,b s). This therefore contradicts the assumption that (r0,g0,x 0,s 0)a c h i e v e sa
higher value for the proposer’s problem. ¥











τ=1 be two equilibria with associated round
one value functions v0(b,A)a n dv1(b,A). Let x∗
0 and x∗
1 be the debt levels chosen in the BAU
regimes of the two equilibria and suppose that x∗
0 ≤ x∗
1. W ew i l ld e m o n s t r a t et h a ti tm u s tb e
the case that x∗
0 = x∗
1. To do this, we will show that the assumption that x∗
0 <x ∗
1 results in a
contradiction.
As in the proof of existence, deﬁne the operator Tz : F∗ → F as follows:













49We know that Tz(v) ∈ F∗ and that Tz is a contraction. Moreover, for i ∈ {0,1},w eh a v et h a t
Tx∗
i(vi)=vi.
Now let v ∈ F∗ be such that for all b, v(·,A)i sd i ﬀerentiable at b for almost all A and for each















k=1 converges to vi.W e n o w
establish the following result:
Claim: Let ρ0 ∈ (0,ρ). Then, for all k and for any x ∈ [x∗














Proof: The proof proceeds via induction. Consider ﬁrst the claim for k =1 .R e c a l lf r o mS t e p1




s.t. B(r,g,x;b) ≥ 0, g ≤ g∗(A), r ≥ r∗, x ∈ [z,x]
,
then: (i) if A ≤ A∗(b,xn
z(v)) then (r,g)=( r∗,g∗(A)) and x ∈ Xn
z (v)∩{x : B(r∗,g∗(A),x;b) ≥ 0};
(ii) if A ∈ (A∗(b,xn
z(v)),A ∗(b,xq
z(v))] then (r,g)=( r∗,g∗(A)) and B(r∗,g∗(A),x;b) = 0; and
(iii) if A>A ∗(b,xq
z(v)) (r,g,x)i su n i q u e l yd e ﬁned, the budget constraint is binding, r>r ∗ and
g<g ∗(A). Denote the solution in case (iii) as (rz(b,A;v),g z(b,A;v),x z(b,A;v)).
















If A ∈ (A∗(b,xn
z(v)),A ∗(b,xq
z(v))], then
Tz(v)(b,A)=u(w(1 − r∗),g∗(A);A)+δEv(pg∗(A)+( 1+ρ)b − R(r∗),A 0)




= −δEv0(pg∗(A)+( 1+ρ)b − R(r∗),A 0)(1 + ρ).
Notice for future reference that in this range, x ∈ (xn
z(v),x q
z(v)] and hence




























n(1 − rz(b,A;v)(1 + ε))
(1 + ρ).






























1 − rz(b,A;v)(1 + ε)
]dG(A).
Applying this to the problem at hand, let x ∈ [x∗




1+ρ0 . Then, to prove



















































It is straightforward to verify that the following four conditions are suﬃcient for this inequality
to hold: (i) A∗(x,xn
x∗








0(v)), (iii) for all







∂v(pg∗(A)+( 1+ρ)x − R(r∗),A 0)
∂b
≥− E
∂v(pg∗(A)+( 1+ρ)f(x) − R(r∗),A 0)
∂b
,














51We will now show that these four conditions are satisﬁed. We begin with condition (i). If it
were not satisﬁed, then A∗(x,xn
x∗
1(v)) ≥ A∗(f(x),x n
x∗




























0.G i v e nt h ed e ﬁnition of xn
x∗

















1(v) - a contradiction.
Condition (ii) can be established in the same way and condition (iii) follows directly from the
assumption that v(·,A) is concave. This leaves condition (iv). From the ﬁrst order conditions





















































0) < 0, which is a contradiction.
















































































































Following the same approach as above, for this inequality to hold, the following four conditions
are suﬃcient: (i) A∗(x,xn
x∗
1(v1


























k(pg∗(A)+( 1+ρ)f(x) − R(r∗),A 0)
∂b
,



















We will again show that these four conditions are satisﬁed. We begin with condition (i). If
it were not satisﬁe d ,t h e ni tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tA∗(x,xn
x∗
1(v1







k) − (1 + ρ)x ≥ xn
x∗
0(v0













































which is a contradiction.
We can use similar logic to conclude that condition (ii) is satisﬁed. Condition (iii) follows
immediately from the induction step since we have that
pg∗(A)+( 1+ρ)x − R(r∗) − [x∗
1 − x∗
0] >p g ∗(A)+( 1+ρ)f(x) − R(r∗).























































































































1+ρ0 which is a contradiction. If xx∗
0(f(x),A;v0
k)=x,




k) and the same contradiction arises.
¥
To complete the uniqueness proof, observe that for i ∈ {0,1} the function E(vi(·,A)) is concave





is a sequence of concave and diﬀerentiable functions
such that for all x limk→∞ E(vi
k(x,A)) = E(vi(x,A)). Thus, by Theorem 25.7 of Rockafellar









































































0, which contradicts the fact that x∗
1 >x ∗
0.
It follows that x∗
0 = x∗












10.6 Proof of Proposition 3
Given the discussion in the text, the only thing we need to show is that the equilibrium debt
distribution converges to a unique invariant distribution. Let ψt(x) denote the distribution func-
tion of the current level of debt at the beginning of period t. The distribution function ψ1(x)i s
exogenous and is determined by the economy’s initial level of debt b0. To describe the distribution
of debt in periods t ≥ 2, we must ﬁrst describe the transition function implied by the equilibrium.
First, deﬁne the function b A :[ x,x] × (x∗,x] → [A,A]a sf o l l o w s :
b A(b,x)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
A if x<x (b,A)
min{A ∈ [A,A]:x(b,A)=x} if x ∈ [x(b,A),x(b,A)]
A if x>x (b,A)
.
Intuitively, b A(b,x) is the smallest value of public goods under which the equilibrium debt level





G( b A(b,x)) if x ∈ (x∗,x]
G(A∗(b,x∗)) if x = x∗
.
Intuitively, H(b,x) is the probability that in the next period the initial level of debt will be less
than or equal to x ∈ [x∗,x]i ft h ec u r r e n tl e v e lo fd e b ti sb. Using this notation, the distribution





55The sequence of distributions hψt(x)i converges to the distribution ψ(x) if for all x ∈ [x∗,x],





We can now establish that the sequence of debt distributions hψt(x)i converges to a unique in-
variant distribution ψ∗(x).
It is easy to prove that the transition function H(b,x) has the Feller Property and that it is
monotonic in b (see Ch. 12.4 in Stokey, Lucas and Prescott (1989) for deﬁnitions). By Theorem
12.12 in Stokey, Lucas and Prescott (1989), therefore, the result follows if the following “mixing
condition” is satisﬁed:
Mixing Condition: There exists an  >0 and m ≥ 1,s u c ht h a tHm(x,x∗) ≥   and 1 −




Intuitively, this condition requires that if we start out with the highest level of debt x,t h e nw e
w i l le n du pa tx∗ with probability greater than   after m p e r i o d s ,w h i l ei fw es t a r to u tw i t ht h e
lowest level of debt x, we will end up above x∗ with probability greater than   in m periods. For
any b ∈ [x,x]a n dA ∈ [A,A]d e ﬁne the sequence hφm(b,A)i as follows: φ0(b,A)=b, φm+1(b,A)=
x(φm(b,A),A). Thus, φm(b,A) is the level of debt if the debt level were b at time 0 and the shock
was A in periods 1 through m. Recall that, by assumption, there exists some positive constant
ξ>0, such that for any pair of realizations satisfying A<A 0, the diﬀerence G(A0)−G(A)i sa tl e a s t
as big as ξ(A0 −A). This implies that for any b ∈ [x,x], Hm(b,φm(b,A+λ))−Hm(b,φm(b,A)) ≥
ξmλm for all λ such that 0 <λ<A − A. Using this observation, we can prove:
Claim 1: For m suﬃciently large, Hm(x,x∗) > 0.
Proof: It suﬃces to show that for m suﬃciently large A∗(φm(x,A),x ∗) >A .T h e n ,f o ra n ys u c h









33 In the present environment, this deﬁnition is equivalent to the requirement that the sequence of probability
measures associated with hψt(x)i converges weakly to the probability measure associated with ψ(x)( s e eS t o k e y ,





≥ G(A∗(φm(x,A + λm),x ∗))
£
Hm−1(x,φm−1(x,A + λm)) − Hm−1(x,φm−1(x,A))
¤
≥ G(A∗(φm(x,A + λm),x ∗))(ξλm)
m−1 > 0.
Suppose, to the contrary, that for all m we have that A∗(φm(x,A),x ∗) ≤ A. Then, it must be
t h ec a s et h a tt h es e q u e n c ehφm(x,A)i is decreasing. To see this note that since r(b,A)i si n c r e a s i n g
in A we have that
1 − r(φk(x,A),A)






1 − r(φk(x,A),A)(1 + ε)
)dG(A).
But the ﬁrst order condition for x(b,A) (see (11) with appropriate value function) and the deriv-
ative of the value function (23) imply that:
1 − r(φk−1(x,A),A)






1 − r(φk(x,A),A)(1 + ε)
)dG(A). (A.6)
Since r(b,A)i si n c r e a s i n gi nb and A, this implies φk−1(x,A) >φ k(x,A).
We can therefore assume without loss of generality that φm(x,A) converges to some ﬁnite
β ≥ x. We now prove that this yields a contradiction. Taking the limit as m →∞ ,c o n t i n u i t yo f
r(·,A) would imply limk→∞ r(φk(x,A),A)=r(φ∞(x,A),A) for all A. Using condition (A.4):
1 − r(φ∞(x,A),A)






1 − r(φ∞(x,A),A)(1 + ε)
)dG(A)
which is impossible since r(φ∞(x,A),A) is strictly increasing in A. We conclude therefore that
for m suﬃciently large A∗(φm(x,A),x ∗) >A , which yields the result. ¥
Next, we can establish:
Claim 2: For all m ≥ 2, 1 − Hm(x,x ∗) ≥ G(A∗(x,x ∗))G(A∗(x∗,x ∗))m−2 [1 − G(A∗(x∗,x ∗))].
Proof: With probability G(A∗(x,x ∗)) the level of debt chosen in period 1 is x∗ when the initial
level of debt is x; so with probability G(A∗(x,x ∗))G(A∗(x∗,x ∗))m−2 the level of debt is x∗ for the
ﬁrst m − 1 periods. Given this, the probability that the level of debt is larger than x∗ in period
m is at least G(A∗(x,x ∗))G(A∗(x∗,x ∗))m−2 [1 − G(A∗(x∗,x ∗))]. ¥
These two Claims imply that the Mixing Condition is satisﬁed if q<n .T os e et h i s ,c h o o s em
suﬃciently large so that Hm(x,x∗) > 0. This is always possible by Claim 1. Now let
  =m i n
©
G(A∗(x,x ∗))G(A∗(x∗,x ∗))m−2 [1 − G(A∗(x∗,x ∗))];Hm(x,x∗)
ª





(24)) and A∗(x,x ∗) >A ∗(x∗,x ∗) >A .T h u s , >0 and the condition is satisﬁed. ¥
10.7 Proof of Proposition 4
This result follows from Step 7 of the existence part of the proof of Proposition 2. ¥
10.8 Completion of the Proof of Proposition 1
As discussed in the text, Proposition 4 implies that legislative decision-making delivers the plan-
ner’s solution when q = n. Thus, we just need to show that when q = n, the equilibrium debt
level will reach x with probability one. Since x∗ = x when q = n, Claim 1 of Proposition 3 implies
that there exists a  >0a n dam such that for any initial b, the probability that x = x in the next
m periods is at least  . Thus, the probability that x is never equal to x in the next j · m periods
is not larger than (1 −  )
j. Since limj→∞ (1 −  )
j = 0, we conclude that the probability that x is
never equal to x is zero. ¥
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